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ARTICLES
DIVORCE AND THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF




In 1992, Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow explored the relationship of
"real world conditions"' to the development of feminist legal theory and
challenged legal scholars to "'mainstream[ ]' "" feminist legal theory into
less obvious core and secondary fields of legal doctrine. In recent years,
the bankruptcy field has been the focus of some feminist writing, with
particular emphasis on women as debtors in bankruptcy.4 This Article is
a continuation of those recent works, using feminist legal theory to con-
centrate on the marital debt discharge provision of the United States
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1. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493,
1495 (1992).
2. Id. at 1496.
3. Id.; see also Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of
Individual Debtors, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1506 (1990) (examining the bankruptcy system and
providing a new "picture" of the bankruptcy debtor in her review of TERESA A. SULLIVAN
ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN
AMERICA (1989)).
4. See, e.g., Zipporah B. Wiseman, Women in Bankruptcy and Beyond, 65 IND. L.J.
107 (1989) (responding to SULLIVAN, supra note 3).
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Bankruptcy Code5 and how it impacts women as creditors. Specifically,
this Article focuses on women who are adversely affected when their ex-
husbands discharge marital debts in bankruptcy, and suggests that Con-
gress, in enacting the marital debt discharge provision, and the bank-
ruptcy courts, in determining whether to allow an ex-husband to
discharge these debts, ignored gender-specific factors that render this
particular provision of the Bankruptcy Code anything but gender-neutral.
As a result, ex-wives and ex-husbands receive inconsistent redress in the
bankruptcy courts.
This Article not only addresses the problem of one section of the Bank-
ruptcy Code that impacts women unequally, but it also attempts to ex-
plain, in the language of feminist legal theory,6 "why" this apparent
disparity exists. Assuming that women fare worse than men when marital
debts are discharged in bankruptcy, what causes this disparate treatment
when the courts are interpreting an ostensibly gender-neutral statute?
Professor Robin L. West, in her critique of feminist legal theory, argues
that gender-specific pain cannot be communicated to an outside world
unless it is first described in more accurate detail than it has been in the
past. She suggests that "[i]t is hard to empathize with the pain of another,
when the nature of that pain is not understood."7 Hence, this Article
attempts to articulate certain gender-specific results that occur when
5. Pub. L. No. 95-598, title I, Sec. 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified primarily as Title
11 United States Code), amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, and by the Bankruptcy Judges, United States
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088.
6. The author recognizes that, although there are various strands of feminist legal
theory, all are not represented in this Article. The depth with which certain branches of
feminist jurisprudence are incorporated into this Article is not meant to marginalize, de-
value, or reject any other branch. The particular strands chosen represent those which the
author found most illuminating when trying to harmonize the theoretical with the practical,
following Carrie Menkel-Meadow's instruction that "it is important to keep theory
grounded in real world conditions, just as real world legal struggles cause us to change or
modify our theories." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 1495; see also Alex M. Johnson,
Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991) (explaining why the author chose
to adopt one particular characterization of the strands of feminist jurisprudence over
another).
An article purporting to analyze one aspect of the Bankruptcy Code by means of femi-
nist legal theory must also include a recognition of women's historical roles in our society
and must address their role today, focusing on the status of women in the bankruptcy
system. A detailed discussion of the development of feminist legal theory in this piece is
unnecessary because the existing scholarship in this area of the law more than adequately
reviews the historical roles of women in American culture. See, e.g., MARTHA A.
FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE RE-
FORM (1991); MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM (1992).
7. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 85 (1987).
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bankruptcy courts try to determine if marital obligations will be dis-
charged in bankruptcy.
Finally, in response to the aforementioned problem, this Article pro-
poses a change in the bankruptcy courts' analyses of marital debt dis-
charge questions, suggesting that Congress amend section 523(a)(5) of
the Bankruptcy Code and challenging. bankruptcy judges and lawyers to
rethink how ex-wives are treated in bankruptcy.
II. HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION
In order to explain the bankruptcy process and the specific problem
women face with regard to the discharge of marital debts in bankruptcy,
it is helpful to relate the predicament in which "Mary," a typical ex-wife,
finds herself at the end of her marriage:
Mary is a twenty-six year old mother of one, who recently divorced her
husband, John, also twenty-six, after five years of marriage. Both Mary
and John have college degrees in business administration; however, Mary
became pregnant just before graduation, and while she received her de-
gree, she postponed starting her career to stay home and raise the
couple's child. John, meanwhile, obtained an entry-level management
position with a large corporation. Within four years, John had progressed
up the corporate ladder to middle management.
Mary's and John's divorce was fairly amicable but certain issues had to
be litigated; namely the division of the couple's assets and liabilities and
spousal support. At the time of the divorce, the couple had very few
assets. They were making payments on a house worth $70,000 (with a
$63,000 mortgage), owned two cars (each worth approximately the same
amount as their respective loan balances), and owned nearly $5000 in
miscellaneous property, all of which was free and clear of any lien or
encumbrance. In addition to the mortgage and car loans, Mary and John
owed approximately $8000 in credit card debt and nearly $2000 on an
unsecured personal loan that the couple obtained from a finance
company.
At trial, the divorce court heard testimony on the issue of support,
finding that both Mary and John were young and well-educated. The
court further found that both spouses had relatively the same earning
capacity, concluding that Mary was not entitled to alimony or spousal
support from John. The court held, however, that Mary would have sole
custody of the couple's four year-old child, that John would have liberal
visitation, and that John would pay a statutorily-prescribed percentage of
his monthly income to Mary as child support. John did not contest these
holdings, realizing that his management position required a significant
19941
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amount of travel and that Mary was therefore the better parent for their
child.
In addition to its findings regarding the couple's child, the court or-
dered John to pay the credit card debts and the personal loan. The court
also awarded each spouse a vehicle, but required John to make payments
on both car loans. The allocation of debts to John was made because, as
the court noted, "John was the only spouse who presently had an in-
come." Regarding the couple's house, the court allowed John to maintain
the home as his residence, but ordered him to pay Mary $3500 (one-half
of the equity in the home) in two annual payments of $1750, with the first
payment due nine months after the divorce judgment became final and
nonappealable.
One day after the divorce decree was final and nonappealable, Mary
received notice from the local bankruptcy court that John had filed for
personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.' Ulti-
mately, John successfully discharged all of his debts-including the di-
vorce obligations to Mary as well as the debts that the couple owed to
third larties-leaving Mary with sole responsibility for all of the couple's
debts. In addition, John was able to retain the property he was awarded
in the divorce, including his car and the house. Mary, on the other hand,
could not afford to maintain the payments for the car she drove, forcing
her to surrender it to the lienholder.
III. BANKRUPTCY LAW
A. History
Any discussion of the effect of bankruptcy on certain individuals neces-
sarily involves a review of bankruptcy procedure and a detailed explana-
tion of the statutory provision that is the subject of focus. The United
States Bankruptcy Code (the Code), enacted in 1978, was intended to
provide an equitable and orderly means by which to alter the relationship
between debtors and creditors.9 Within the Code, there are several chap-
ters under which a debtor may file for bankruptcy court protection. Each
chapter provides a different form of relief, to wit: Chapter 7 (liquida-
tion),'0 Chapter 9 (adjustment of debts of a municipality)," Chapter 11
8. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a) requires the bankruptcy clerk to notify creditors that a
debtor has filed for bankruptcy.
9. In re Pommerer, 10 B.R. 935, 946 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
11. Id. §§ 901-946.
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(reorganization), 2 Chapter 12 (family farmer debt readjustment), 3 and
Chapter 13 (adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income).1
4
Most consumers file for either a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 15
In the hypothetical case described above, Mary's ex-husband filed for a
Chapter 7 liquidation, also known as a "straight bankruptcy," seeking to
retain as much of his property as the law allows while at the same time
seeking to discharge as many debts as the law permits.
Bankruptcy courts have historically been perceived as courts of equity,
with bankruptcy laws recognized as existing for the honest but unfortu-
nate debtor.' 6 The courts' purpose is twofold: (1) to collect the nonex-
empt assets of the debtor and distribute them to her unsecured creditors;
and (2) to provide the debtor with a fresh financial start, free from past
financial mistakes.' 7 Debt forgiveness,'" the hallmark of bankruptcy law,
is not an absolute right bestowed upon a debtor. Although Congress in-
tended bankruptcy to shield debtors from their pre-bankruptcy unsecured
creditors and provide them with a fresh start, there are provisions within
the Code listing certain types of debts as nondischargeable.' 9 One such
provision, section 523(a)(5), concerns debts owed to a spouse or former
spouse, 2 and provides that certain debts owed to an ex-spouse be ex-
12. Id. §§ 1101-1174.
13. Id. 9H 1201-1231.
14. Id. § 1301-1330.
15. JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY & CREDITORS' RioHTs 55 (1985).
16. See, e.g., Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68,77 (1904), superseded by statute as stated
in United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1986); H.R. REP. No. 5, 27th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1841).
17. Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1047, 1049-50 (1987).
18. Chapter 7 bankruptcies are completed, as far as the debtor is concerned, when a
debtor receives a discharge from the bankruptcy court, relieving the obligation to pay un-
secured debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 727; see also In re Pody, 42 B.R. 570 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1984) (imposing sanctions against a creditor for violating automatic stay in an attempt to
collect a dischargeable debt).
19. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 1328 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (listing nondischargeable types of
debts); id. § 727 (1988) (establishing certain criteria which would prevent a debtor from
discharging any debts).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Section 523(a)(5) provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, mainte-
nance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination
made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or prop-
erty settlement agreement, but not to the extent that-
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or
otherwise ... ; or
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cepted from discharge.2' Specifically, the Code provides that those debts
which are "in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support,"22 are
deemed nondischargeable in bankruptcy. This exception is limited, how-
ever, in that under both the Code and its predecessor, the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 (the 1898 Act), 23 debts arising out of property settlements (or
some other division of property by spouses who are parties to a divorce)
are dischargeable in bankruptcy.
24
Alimony and similar marital debts became officially nondischargeable
in 1903 by an amendment to the 1898 Act.' The new law stated: "A
discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable
debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as... (7) are for
alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or
child."26 The amendment was a codification of the then-existing trend in
common law whereby state courts denied debtors the right to discharge
alimony debts.27
Prior to the 1903 amendment, most courts viewed alimony not as a
debt founded upon a contract, but as a penalty imposed for failure to
perform a duty.28 Moreover, because the amount of alimony to be paid
was subject to modification if the parties' circumstances changed, even a
calculable alimony arrearage was considered a nonprovable debt.29
Therefore, because alimony was viewed as a duty and not a debt, and
unpaid arrears were viewed as nonprovable debts, neither was discharge-
able in bankruptcy under common law.30 Both the 1903 amendment to
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or sup-




22. In re Slingerland, 87 B.R. 981, 985 (Bankr. S.D. I11. 1988) (citation omitted).
23. Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act listed the exceptions to discharge. Act of July 1,
1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550, repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549,
2682.
24. Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976) (construing the Bankruptcy Act);
In re Seidel, 48 B.R. 371 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1984) (construing the Code).
25. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, § 5, 32 Stat. 797, 798 (repealed 1978).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Barclay v. Barclay, 56 N.E. 636 (II1. 1900), error dismissed, 21 S. Ct. 923
(1901); Romaine v. Chauncey, 29 N.E. 826 (N.Y. 1892); Noyes v. Hubbard, 23 A. 727 (Vt.
1892);.see also Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340 (1903) (citing the Bankruptcy Act amend-
ment to reveal the existing trend in state courts even though not enacted prior to the
Court's holding).
28. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 73 (1904) (stating that a husband has a natural
and legal duty to support his wife), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Sut-
ton, 786 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1986).
29. Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 579-80 (1901).
30. Dunbar, 190 U.S. at 353.
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the 1898 Act and the common law which preceded it reflected the societal
norm of the time that it was a man's unavoidable duty to care for his wife
and children, even after divorce.3
In 1977, section 17(a)(7) of the 1898 Act was struck down as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.32 The
following year, the Code was adopted and section 523(a)(5)"3 became the
gender-neutral replacement for section 17(a)(7) of the 1898 Act.
B. Procedural Requirements
The process a creditor must follow in trying to prevent a debtor from
discharging a debt is known, generically, as an adversary proceeding.34
This adversary proceeding exists within the main bankruptcy case to
which it relates, and is usually heard and adjudicated by the bankruptcy
court in much the same way as any lawsuit would be.35 Although there
are other types of adversary proceedings within a bankruptcy case,36 a
challenge by a spouse or former spouse to the debtor's desire to discharge
31. The United States Supreme Court illustrated courts' views toward women gener-
ally in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872), stating that:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many
of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which
is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which be-
long, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband.
... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother.
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring); see also Barbara A. Brown, et al., The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 937
(1971) (stating that at common law, a woman who married "lost virtually all legal status as
an individual human being and was regarded by the law almost entirely in terms of her
relationship with her husband").
32. Schiffman v. Wasserman, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 611 (MB) (D.R.I. 1977) (finding
that forbidding men to discharge alimony debts in bankruptcy while allowing women to
discharge such debts reflected archaic and overbroad stereotypes which were unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
34. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.
35. The bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over family law proceedings arising in or re-
lated to a case filed under Title 11 of the United States Code (the Bankruptcy Code) is not
exclusive; the federal court's jurisdiction is concurrent with any other court, including fam-
ily law courts, that could exercise jurisdiction over such proceedings. HENRY J. SOMMER &
MARGARET D. MCGARITY, COLLIER FAMILY LAW AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
5.01[2][b][iii], at 5-11 (1993).
36. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.
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marital debts is known more specifically as a complaint "to determine
dischargeability of a debt.",
37
In the hypothetical situation presented at the beginning of this Article,
Mary received notice that John had filed for bankruptcy, a proceeding in
which he ultimately discharged his obligations both to Mary and to the
couple's marital creditors. The discharge of John's obligations raises the
question of what, if anything, Mary could have done to prevent it. The
answer to this question is relatively simple: She could have filed a com-
plaint to determine dischargeability of a debt pursuant to section
523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, seeking to have the marital obliga-
tions excepted from discharge.3" The more difficult issues are why she
did not take any action and what would have resulted had she filed a
dischargeability complaint.
There are a myriad of reasons why Mary may not have filed a com-
plaint. In all likelihood, she did not know she could oppose John on an
issue seemingly separate from their divorce proceeding. 9 She may not
have been aware that the Bankruptcy Code provides safeguards to pre-
vent a debtor, like John, from discharging debts that public policy dictates
should not be discharged.40 Moreover, it is entirely possible that Mary
did not see John's bankruptcy filing as another move in a continuing chess
game (his view), but instead as one more in a long series of painful events
involving John (her view).41 From the facts given, it is impossible to de-
termine what drove John to the federal bankruptcy court, and equally
impossible to establish why Mary did not oppose his action. Perhaps he
was being opportunistic and vindictive; on the other hand, perhaps he
37. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
39. See Gross, supra note 3, at 1532 (citing studies indicated that absence of power, in
part, explains women's poverty).
40. Id.
41. In her thoughtful piece on the ways in which feminists "do law," Katharine T.
Bartlett writes:
Some feminists have claimed that women approach the reasoning process dif-
ferently than men do. In particular, they say that women are more sensitive to
situation and context, that they resist universal principles and generalizations, es-
pecially those that do not fit their own experiences, and that they believe that
"the practicalities of everyday life" should not be neglected for the sake of ab-
stract justice.
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 849 (1990) (citing
MARY BELENKY, ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF,
VOICE, AND MIND (1986); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Differ-
ent Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39
(1985); Suzanna Sherry" Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication,
72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986)).
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faced a legitimate financial threat because the divorce forced him to as-
sume more debt than he could handle. By failing to file a complaint to
determine the dischargeability of the couple's marital debts, however,
Mary will really never know why John filed for bankruptcy.
Unfortunately, Mary's failure to take action against John in the bank-
ruptcy court is quite possibly due to the fact that she lacked the legal and
financial sophistication to know she had legal options with regard to
John's bankruptcy.42 Regrettably, some women, due to their socialization
or to inherent biological and/or psychological differences between the
sexes, rely on the men in their lives to provide them with security, direc-
tion, and an identity.43 These women perpetuate the cycle of hurt that
has been visited upon them by divorce, which mandates that they break
free from this cycle of reliance.'
Assuming, however, that Mary had filed an adversary proceeding
against John in the bankruptcy court, there are no assurances in the law
that she would have prevailed and prevented him from discharging his
obligations to her or to their marital creditors.
C. Dischargeability Analysis
In bankruptcy, the party asserting the nondischargeability of a marital
debt has the burden of proof.45 That party must establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the debt in question is in the nature of ali-
mony, maintenance, or support, and is not a property settlement.46 Such
42. See Gross, supra note 3, at 1532.
43. GILLIGAN, supra note 41, at 61.
44. Carol Gilligan has suggested that a woman's freedom from male domination and
influence is, at best, illusory. Id. She writes that women's "morality hierarchy" simply
does not allow women to place self above others without terrible moral and personal di-
lemmas. Id. at 136-37. The author illustrates these dilemmas in many ways but most effec-
tively when put in the context of an unwanted pregnancy:
The conflict between self and other thus constitutes the central moral problem
for women, posing a dilemma whose resolution requires a reconciliation between
femininity and adulthood. In the absence of such a reconciliation, the moral
problem cannot be resolved. The "good woman" masks assertion in evasion, de-
nying responsibility by claiming only to meet the needs of others, while the "bad
woman" forgoes or renounces the commitments that bind her in self-deception
and betrayal.
Id. at 70-71.
45. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4005; see also Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592 (1923) (holding that a
creditor who would avoid the effect of a discharge must prove himself within an-exception,
while a debtor who would avoid that exception must prove himself within an exception to
the exception); In re Hall, 119 B.R. 272 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Slingerland, 87 B.R.
981 (Bankr. S.D. Il. 1988); In re Altavilla, 40 B.R. 938 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
46. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 283 (1991) (rejecting the "clear and convincing"
standard).
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strict requirements to prevent discharge often present a formidable chal-
lenge for a creditor. The advantage for the debtor47 arises because Con-
gress clearly intended, in drafting the Code, to provide debtors with a
fresh financial start."
In determining whether certain obligations created by a divorce court
(or as a consequence of a divorce) may be discharged in bankruptcy, the
bankruptcy court 49 makes an assessment and characterization of the evi-
dence independent from the divorce court's previous findings.5 0 In fact,
although the bankruptcy court may often agree with the divorce court,
the federal tribunal is not bound by state law in determining which mari-
tal/divorce obligations are dischargeable. 1 Moreover, bankruptcy judges
may look beyond the four corners of a divorce decree or property settle-
ment agreement in trying to determine whether or not a debt is in the
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, and therefore undischarge-
47. "'[T]he analysis of dischargeability under Section 523 must begin with the assump-
tion that dischargeability is favored under the Code unless the complaining spouse, who
has the burden of proof, demonstrates that the obligation is actually in the nature of ali-
mony, maintenance or support."' In re Quinn, 97 B.R. 837, 839 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1988)
(quoting Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074, 1077 (4th Cir. 1986)).
48. Slingerland, 87 B.R. at 984. The Supreme Court has stated that "a central purpose
of the Code is to provide a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their
affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting
debt."' Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244
(1934), superseded by statute stated in In re Nadler, 122 B.R. 162 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990)).
49. Section 523(a)(5) disputes are not reserved for the federal courts exclusively: the
dischargeability determination may be decided by state courts unless a complaint is filed by
a debtor or by a creditor in the bankruptcy court. See Sheryl L. Scheible, Bankruptcy and
the Modification of Support: Fresh Start, Head Start, or False Start?, 69 N.C. L. REv. 577
(1991). However, filing a complaint in state court provides only the illusion of indepen-
dence from federal law because state courts must still apply federal law when determining
section 523(a)(5) questions. Id. at 626.
50. To determine whether a debt was intended to be in the nature of alimony, mainte-
nance, or support, the bankruptcy court relies primarily on: 1) the language and substance
of the agreement in the context of the surrounding circumstances, and, if necessary, extrin-
sic evidence, which may be of limited use since the parties are not likely to have contem-
plated the impact of bankruptcy on the agreement; 2) the parties' financial circumstances
at the time of the settlement; and 3) whether the function served by the obligation at the
time of the settlement was to maintain daily necessities. In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759 (3d
Cir. 1990).
51. In re Long, 794 F.2d 928 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding a $65,000 jury award to a wife in a
Georgia divorce proceeding was intended to be alimony and, therefore, nondischargeable);
In re Dunn, 10 B.R. 385 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981); In re Pelikant, 5 B.R. 404 (Bankr. N.D.
I11. 1980) (holding an award of attorneys' fees in a divorce action to be a debt in the form of
alimony and, therefore, nondischargeable); S. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787-5865; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320; see also U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress the author-
ity to establish uniform laws of bankruptcy throughout United States).
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able. 2 As one author notes, "Applying federal law provides the bank-
ruptcy court with the flexibility to transcend the divorce decree's literal
language and to focus on the substantive nature of the obligation
involved."53
The problematic issue for those in the bankruptcy community is trying
to predict when the bankruptcy court will reach a conclusion on the char-
acterization of a debt contrary to that of the divorce court. Often, in
seeking to protect the rights of a debtor or to safeguard the claims of a
creditor, the bankruptcy court is willing to invoke equity principles to
reexamine issues assumed to have been resolved by a divorce court.
Therefore, it is difficult for litigants to predict with any degree of cer-
tainty how a bankruptcy court will resolve their particular dispute. In all
fairness to bankruptcy judges, however, the courts seem hesitant to tread
on state courts' autonomy.
In pursuit of its independent determination on the classification of
debt, as many as twenty factors have been articulated by bankruptcy
courts to assist in determining whether a marital obligation may be dis-
charged.54 As one might imagine, the factors are weighted differently as
52. Pelikant, 5 B.R. at 406-07 (stating that both federal and state law will play a part in
defining alimony, maintenance, and support); 3 BANKR. L. ED., CODE COMMENTARY AND
ANALYSIS § 22.75 (1983 & Supp. 1992); see also In re Carrigg, 14 B.R. 658 (Bankr. D. S.C.
1981) (holding that even when a divorce decree includes a waiver of alimony under state
law, a bankruptcy court may still determine that the debt was in fact in the form of alimony
and, therefore, nondischargeable).
The court in In re Diers, 7 B.R. 18 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980), held that section
523(a)(5)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code reflected a legislative intent to direct courts to look
behind a designation of alimony and to determine the true nature of the liability. Id. at 20;
see also In re Quinn, 97 B.R. 837 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1988). The bankruptcy court in Quinn
held that payments were in fact alimony even though the divorce agreement expressly
stated "[tihe parties agree that the cash payments described above shall not be considered
alimony." Id. at 838. The Quinn court looked "[b]eyond the [plarties' [flinal [algreement"
to determine that the payments were in fact alimony and were nondischargeable. Id. at
839.
53. Timothy Kline, Bankruptcy and Divorce, 10 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 561, 568
(1985).
54. See Daulton v. Daulton, 139 B.R. 708 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992), wherein the court
cites the following twenty factors:
1. Whether the settlement agreement includes payment for the ex-spouse; 2.
Whether there is any indication that provisions within the agreement were in-
tended to balance the relative incomes of the parties; 3. The position of the as-
sumption to pay debts within the agreement; 4. The character or method of
payment of the assumption; 5. The nature of the obligation; 6. Whether children
resulted which had to be provided for; 7. The relative future earning power of the
spouses; 8. The adequacy of support absent debt assumption; 9. The parties' un-
derstanding of the provisions; 10. The label of the obligations; 11. The age of the
parties; 12. The health of the parties; 13. Existence of "hold harmless" or assump-
tion terminology; 14. Whether the assumption terminated upon death or remar-
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courts across the country attempt to determine whether a marital debt is
dischargeable. 5 A real concern is presented however, inasmuch as the
provisions in section 523(a)(5) of the Code virtually have forced bank-
ruptcy courts to "second-guess" state courts.
If a bankruptcy court must second-guess the determinations of a state's
divorce court, however, should not the bankruptcy court-the court of
equity-take into consideration the experiences and the changing roles of
women in society? In particular, should not the court consider the effect
a potential shift in the rights and responsibilities of the parties to a di-
vorce will have on the emerging rights and responsibilities that women
have with regard to themselves as female persons?56 Is it not the role of a
court of equity to do what is right and fair between the parties who are
before it?57 Many would argue that the bankruptcy courts are currently
doing what is right and fair only for men. Assuming the validity of this
riage; 15. Whether the parties had counsel; 16. Whether there was a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent waiver of rights; 17. Length of the marriage; 18. Em-
ployment of the parties; 19. The demeanor and credibility of the parties; 20. Other
special or unique circumstances of the parties.
Id. at 710.
55. For a more complete discussion, see infra part VII.
56. The field of feminist legal theory encompasses not just this rhetorical question but
also the full range of experiences that women face in marriage and in society at large.
Feminist legal theory concerns not only legal issues that directly affect or disproportion-
ately impact women, but also the broader epistemological questions: e.g., what counts as
legitimate knowledge in the analysis of legal questions? To feminists, personal experience
is important because it is the foundation of our world views and because it affects all we
do. Therefore, the personal is both political and legal. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dia-
lectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv.
589 (1986).
Feminism also aims to deconstruct the current legal system which is based on and em-
bodies male norms. For example, it asks to what extent the problem (that has been identi-
fied in a given discussion) is a product of unstated male norms at work or is the product of
unequal power and concentration of economic resources in men's hands. Id. at 590-92.
It is the author's view that Schneider's interpretation of feminist legal theory aids in a
bankruptcy analysis of section 523(a)(5) of the Code. Consequently, the remainder of this
Article intentionally incorporates nontraditional feminist legal theory into a traditionally
"non-feminist" subject.
57. As Professor Dan B. Dobbs states:
In one sense, the word "equity" implies right, justice, or moral quality. Relat-
edly, it may mean flexibility rather than rigidity.
... Statutory law of divorce, bankruptcy and estate administration is partly the
product of, partly the subject matter of, equity courts. In each case, the substan-
tive rules of equity were made in response either to unduly rigid legal rules, or to
their entire inadequacy, and in each case the substantive rules were purportedly
based on higher moral principle.
DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1, at 24-25 (1973) (footnote
omitted).
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argument, its basis is not necessarily in that the rules are unfair to women,
but rather, because the impact of those rules is inequitable. Thus, a
change will only occur when there is criticism of existing arrangements,
policies, and practices.
58
IV. THE IMPACT OF DIVORCE AND BANKRUPTCY ON WOMEN
Women often must face the double-barreled emotional and financial
impact of a divorce 59 followed by the filing of a bankruptcy petition by
their ex-husband.6' Therefore, it would be inappropriate to assess the
inequities of the discharge provisions in bankruptcy without at least ac-
knowledging the plight of women who are forced to cope with the emo-
tional and financial trauma of divorce while embroiled in an adversary
proceeding in bankruptcy court.6 '
58. See, e.g., Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988) (commenting on
the change in child custody policy due to the input offered by professionals such as social
workers and mediators).
59. In 1988, there were 1,167,000 divorces granted in the United States. U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
tbl. 91, at 73 (113th ed. 1993) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. By 1991, that number
had risen to 1,187,000. Id. The personal ramifications of these divorce statistics can be
both financially and emotionally devastating. Scheible, supra note 49, at 577-78.
60. Scholars and authors acknowledge that bankruptcy frequently follows a divorce.
See John F. Murphy, The Dischargeability in Bankruptcy of Debts for Alimony and Prop-
erty Settlements Arising From Divorce, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 69 (1986) (examining the Bank-
ruptcy Code dichotomy between the nondischargeability of alimony, maintenance, and
support versus the dischargeability of obligations arising from apportionment of debts
through divorce property settlements); Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the
1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 44-47 (1987) (providing
statistics which show that the divorce rate is positively related to Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
filings); Renee Heotis, Comment, Bankruptcy and Divorce: The Countervailing Policy
Concerns, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 723 (1992) (discussing the pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act and
the impact of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 on divorce and bankruptcy).
61. Divorce and bankruptcy, however, are only part of the problem of inequality af-
fecting women in American society. Traditional gender roles themselves establish some of
the concerns that a feminist critique (of the marital debt discharge provisions of the Code)
tries to address:
Anthropologists have found that most societies, across historical periods, have
tended to assign females to infant care and to the duties associated with raising
children because of the biological ability to bear children. In contrast, men usu-
ally concentrate on interfamilial activities, .. . hence gender complementarity has
usually led to political and economic dominance by men.
TERESA AMOTr & JULIE MATTHAEI, RACE, GENDER, AND WORK 14 (1991).
The dilemma for women is not just during marriage. Divorce also raises issues of ine-
quality between the spouses and, conceivably, exacerbates the inequality. Id. at 139. As
this Article reports, divorce often leaves an ex-wife in a worse position than the ex-hus-
band, and bankruptcy (by one or both spouses) frequently follows a divorce.
Catholic University Law Review
Divorce signals an emotional upheaval which has been ranked as the
second most stressful event in a person's life.62 This is supported by data
on physical and mental health status suggesting that there is more emo-
tional disturbance among divorced individuals than widows.6 3 Divorce is
viewed as a process that begins with the escalating distress of the mar-
riage, often peaks at the separation and legal filing, and then ushers in
several years of transition and disequilibrium64 before confidence and
continuity in adult roles and relationships are restored. This period of
disequilibrium, fraught with anxiety and emotional stress, customarily
lasts for a period of two years,65 but many women find that the recovery
takes much longer.66
For many people, divorce signals their first extended dealing with the
legal system, creating an anxiety compounded by their forced involve-
ment with a bureaucratic system and the indifference displayed by judges
and attorneys.67 Legal delays and uncertainties, in addition to the burden
of mounting attorney fees, serve to perpetuate the emotional dise-
quilibrium of the parties and, furthermore, are exacerbated when a party
is required to take further legal action to enforce the obligations imposed
under their divorce decree.68
Women are especially vulnerable following a divorce because, along
with the psychological consequences of loss and separation, many must
also deal with the emotional stress of being thrust into an economic
abyss.69 Unlike men, whose standard of living has been shown to rise
dramatically following divorce, women often experience a sharp decline
62. Divorce ranked second behind death of a spouse in a ranking of 42 stressful life
events. Thomas H. Holmes & Richard H. Rahe, The Social Readjustment Rating Scale, 11
JOURNAL OF PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 213, 213-18 (1967).
63. See generally Gay C. Kitson, et al., Divorcees and Widows: Similarities and Differ-
ences, AM. J. ORTOPSYCHIATRY, Apr. 1980, at 291.
64. Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan B. Kelly, Children and Divorce: A Review, 24 SOCIAL
WORK 468, 468 (1979).
65. Id.
66. After studying 60 middle-class mothers who were divorced for at least two years,
Terry Arendell suggests that the two year period considered typical by researchers con-
ducting psychological studies is understated because the emotional turmoil and stress
caused by economic effects of divorce was not adequately considered. TERRY ARENDELL,
MOTHERS AND DIVORCE: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS 150 (1986).
67. See id. at 9-14.
68. See id. at 9-35.
69. Even though female-headed households make up only 33% of all U.S. households,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 59, tbl. 67, at 56, they comprise nearly half of all fami-
lies living in poverty. Id. tbl. 745, at 473.
Of the 60 women in Arendell's study, 46 had frequent struggles with depression and
despair directly attributable to their financial hardships following divorce, while 26 of the
60 admitted contemplating suicide. ARENDELL, supra note 66, at 46-47.
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in their lifestyle.7" This rapid deterioration in their standard of living
often leaves women, who still identify with a middle class way of life,
struggling with the reality that they now live near or below the poverty
level.
71
For those women who were not working outside of the home prior to
divorce, many must cope with the anxiety and stress of searching for a job
and becoming reacclimated to a professional work environment after
years of absence.72 Unfortunately, years of gender discrimination in the
work place have severely restricted a woman's ability to serve as a fam-
ily's primary wage earner. 73 As a result of this societal wage discrimina-
tion, women are left in the precarious position of desperately relying on
their ex-husband's court-ordered payments, which are all too often spo-
radically provided or totally ignored.
Consider again the hypothetical of Mary, who delayed entry into the
job market in order to raise a child. Even though she is the same age as
her husband and has the same college degree, Mary will have a much
more difficult time obtaining a job and may encounter other problems
because she never worked outside of the marital home.74 It is doubtful
that Mary has developed a professional network as John probably has. It
70. In Lenore Weitzman's 1981 California study, ex-husband standards of living rose
an average of 42% percent while ex-wives suffered a 73% decline. Lenore J. Weitzman,
The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and
Child Support Awards 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181-1251 (1981).
Part of the reason for this dichotomy is, perhaps, that even in community property states
such as California, the man's career development and professional attainments are not
considered assets subject to division even when a women has sacrificed her career in sup-
port of her ex-husband's.
71. In 1986 (the last year for which statistics are available), 42.4% of families with a
female householder and no husband present lived below 125% of the poverty level. U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATE tbl. 750, at 464 (111th ed. 1991). When these statistics are narrowed to include only
such families with related children under 18 years old, 62.3% were living below 125% of
the poverty level. Id.
Following divorce, many women are forced to face the humiliation, harassment, intimi-
dation, and stigmatization of seeking public assistance for the first time. See ARENDELL,
supra note 66, at 72.
72. See Alice H. Cook, Working Women: European Experience and American Need, in
JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 95TH CONG., IST SESS., AMERICAN WOMEN WORKERS IN A
FULL EMPLOYMENT ECONOMY 271 (Comm. Print 1977). In 1988, the median age of wo-
men at first marriage was 23.6. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 59, tbl. 143, at 101. At
divorce, their median age was 32.6. Id. tbl. 144, at 101.
73. When a family has a man as a primary earner, the mean family income from all
sources is $26,329. For a family with a woman as the primary earner, that figure drops to
$14,122. Similarly, excluding other income sources, women as primary earners for a family
earn a mean of $9871 per year while their male counterparts earn $18,524. SULLIVAN,
supra note 3, at 151.
74. ARENDELL, supra note 66, at 54-61.
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is equally unlikely that Mary will impress her interviewer with a resume
of "job skills" that will prompt him or her (more often him) to hire her.75
One explanation of this phenomenon is that, "when career-oriented wo-
men decide to bear and care for children in a traditional fashion (such as
taking time off from employment while the children are young) rather
than following the stereotyped male career pattern, it is interpreted as a
decision to disinvest in the [workplace]." 76
Further compounding the problem, marriages that produce children
usually are dissolved with the women assuming custody of the children.71
Women are therefore encumbered with the primary responsibility of nur-
turing and parenting the children while at the same time being burdened
with the costs of child care and the children's living expenses. Apart from
the obvious temporal, financial, and emotional demands this places on
the single mother, women must also cope with their new found contradic-
tory identity as single woman and mother.78
Both spouses are forced to confront their own emotional trauma result-
ing from the loss and separation of a divorce. For women, however, this
grief is often intensified by the additional burdens they must bear because
of their gender. Men usually preserve some stability in their lives by
maintaining their standard of living and continuing in their same job fol-
lowing a divorce. Women, however, often must cope with a sharp drop in
their standard of living because of their diminished earning capacity, pri-
mary child-rearing responsibilities, and re-entry into the job market. It is
during this period of flux that the court-ordered alimony, support, or
property settlement payments from their ex-husbands are most critical to
women beginning their independent existence. Considering many wo-
men's fragile financial underpinnings following divorce, even slight dis-
ruptions in the receipt of these payments can prove to be financially and
emotionally devastating.79
Interestingly, some of the literature on this subject indicates that while
women have not consciously chosen poverty, they have subconsciously
allowed this phenomenon to exist.80 Unlike information available con-
75. Id. at 54-55.
76. ROSANNA HERTZ; MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: WOMEN AND MEN IN DUAL-
CAREER MARRIAGES 122 (1986).
77. Mavis Maclean & Lenore J. Weitzman, Introduction to Income Support, in Eco-
NOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 187, 188-89 (Le-
nore J. Weitzman & Mavis Maclean eds., 1992) (stating that "[i]n most countries
approximately two-thirds of divorcing couples currently have children of school age," and
that usually the woman is responsible for these children).
78. ARENDELL, supra note 66, at 128.
79. See id. at 53, 76.
80. Professor Joan Williams writes:
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cerning women and divorce, however, bankruptcy courts do not keep sta-
tistics on the number of section 523(a)(5) dischargeability complaints that
are filed. Nonetheless, some information has been gathered indepen-
dently of the courts regarding who uses the bankruptcy system.
Between 1979 and 1981, Professor Philip Shuchman surveyed nine fed-
eral jurisdictions81 to obtain a profile of the American debtor. His re-
search revealed that personal bankruptcies accounted for 88% of all
filings studied.82 Women constituted 31% of the personal bankruptcy
filers, compared to 32% for men and 37% for joint filers. 83 More re-
cently, Teresa Sullivan's work, As We Forgive Our Debtors,' has served
as the statistical fount from which the most up-to-date bankruptcy num-
bers may be drawn. The author's research, completed largely between
1981 and 1985 and also obtained from several jurisdictions, revealed es-
sentially the same basic results as Professor Shuchman's.
8 5
In the 1980s two phenomena have shifted feminists' attention from assimilation-
ists' focus on how individual women are like men to a focus on gender differences,
on how women as a group differ from men as a group. The first is the feminiza-
tion of poverty, which dramatizes the chronic and increasing economic vulnerabil-
ity of women.... The second phenomenon that plays a central role in the current
feminist imagination is that of career women "choosing" to abandon or
subordinate their careers so they can spend time with their small children. These
phenomena highlight the fact that deep-seated social differences continue to en-
courage men and women to make quite different choices with respect to work
and family. Thus, "sameness" scholars are increasingly confronted by the exist-
ence of gender differences.
Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MicH. L. REV. 797, 798-99 (1989) (footnotes
omitted).
81. Philip Shuchman, The Average Bankrupt. A Description and Analysis of 753 Per-
sonal Bankruptcy Filings in Nine States, 88 CoM. L.J. 288 (1983). The bankruptcy jurisdic-
tions surveyed were the District of Arizona, the Eastern District of California, the District
of Columbia, the Northern District of Georgia, the District of Maryland, the District of
Massachusetts, the Western District of Missouri, the Western District of Pennsylvania, and
the Eastern District of Virginia.
82. Id. at 289.
83. Id. "Joint filings" are bankruptcy petitions filed by a husband and wife together.
11 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).
84. SULLIVAN, supra note 3.
85. The authors report:
About 43% of our sample cases, 645 debtors, were bankruptcies filed by a single
debtor, male or female. Of these lone filers, 261 were single-filing women. Thus
single-filing women constituted about 40% of the single filings and about 17% of
all the cases in the sample.
Joint bankruptcies comprise the larger share of consumer bankruptcies. In our
sample, 858 women filed with their husbands, creating a group we refer to as
"joint-filing women." ... Altogether, 74% percent [sic] of our cases have a wo-
man debtor. Our total number of petitioners is 2359, counting two petitioners for
each joint petition, and the proportion of men and women is almost equal: 53%
men, 47% women.
Id. at 149-50.
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Empirical research, focusing on the gender of the parties in section
523(a)(5) (marital debt) disputes, indicates that the party seeking to dis-
charge marital debts is more often the man rather than the woman. To
illustrate this point, statistics were gathered 6 from the United States
bankruptcy courts in the Central District of Illinois and the Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania,' regarding the number of section 523(a)(5) adver-
sary complaints filed in 1992 and the gender of the debtors and the
plaintiffs in those cases. In the Central District of Illinois, 589 adversary
complaints were filed in 1992. Twenty-eight of these complaints were
filed pursuant to section 523(a)(5) of the Code, addressing the dis-
chargeability of marital debts. Of those twenty-eight complaints, men
were the debtors (the party seeking discharge of the debts) in twenty-six
cases while women were the debtors in only two cases. Similarly, in the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, 656 adversary complaints were filed in
1992. Of those complaints, eight were filed pursuant to section 523(a)(5)
of the Code. Of those eight complaints, men were the debtors in six cases
and women were the debtors in remaining two.
These statistics may not seem very important in light of the small
number of adversary matters in the Central District of Illinois and the
Middle District of Pennsylvania."8 Courts have begun to recognize, how-
86. These statistics were obtained for this Article, in part, as an additional means of
supporting the feminist legal theory subtheme of this piece. Original research was neces-
sary largely because of the lack of statistics regarding gender reported by bankruptcy
courts to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Division. The frustra-
tion felt over this dearth of information was best articulated in Teresa Sullivan's work on
the issue:
Much of what we think we know about bankruptcy comes from the data com-
piled by the Administrative Office of the Courts (the AO). Every bankruptcy
court in the country regularly compiles data to transmit to the AO. Some of these
data are published in an annual report, which details the number of bankruptcy
filings, whether they were voluntary filings, in what chapter they were filed, and
whether they were filed singly or jointly by a married couple. The AO report also
classifies cases by whether they are business or nonbusiness bankruptcies. No
other data are reported regularly, so that only the gross numbers and a few simple
categories are known.
Even the few data available are of limited use.
SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 15-16. The statistics compiled for this Article were obtained
from a review of all adversary complaints filed in 1992 in the United States Bankruptcy
Courts of the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the Central District of Illinois. After
identifying the complaints raising a dischargeability issue under § 523(a)(5) of the Code,
each complaint and answer was read to determine whether the ex-husband or the ex-wife
was the party seeking to have the marital debt(s) in question discharged.
87. These jurisdictions were selected because of convenience for the author, not be-
cause they were statistically significant.
88. There is certainly a need for additional empirical research to be conducted in this
area. The drawback is that, because the bankruptcy courts do not record the gender of
those persons filing adversary complaints, all relevant information must be gathered by
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ever, that there is a real distinction between the treatment of men and
women in bankruptcy.8 9 Moreover, the empirical data obtained for this
Article indicates that the problem of disparate treatment involves more
than just thirty-two debtors (and their ex-wives) in two federal judicial
districts.9 There are, after all, bankruptcy courts in ninety-one judicial
districts in the United States and its territories;91 the broader topic of
bankruptcy courts' involvement in domestic relations issues is one that is
troubling to bankruptcy judges' and to the federal judiciary in general.93
V. DISCHARGING MARITAL DEBTS
In the context of discharging marital debts in bankruptcy, an analysis of
gender difference is essential to understanding why section 523(a)(5) ap-
plies to men and women disparately.94 Historically, and arguably cur-
rently, gender socialization in American culture directs, prefers, and
hand, which is an extremely time-consuming process. Notwithstanding the unavailability
of information, one additional source was consulted in preparation for writing this Article.
A review of the annotations listed after 11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (West 1993) reveals that of the
92 separate decisions reported therein, the man was the debtor in 84 cases, the woman was
the debtor in five cases, and the remaining three cases were joint filings.
89. A report by the Ninth Circuit's Gender Bias Task Force states:
The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy asked whether there were any distinc-
tive characteristics of bankruptcy law and practice that implicated gender and
concluded that women and men may indeed be differently affected. After learn-
ing about the large number of women who are creditors and debtors, the Advi-
sory Committee reported its concerns in two areas. The first is that bankruptcy
practice remains predominantly male. The second is the conflicts between obliga-
tions of support, imposed under state law, and federal bankruptcy protections
accorded debtors. State efforts to enable collection of obligations owed to former
spouses may be thwarted by federal bankruptcy interpretations of dischargeable
debts. The failure to obtain such support may in turn trigger women's filing of
bankruptcy.
NINTH CIRCUIT: GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, PRELIMINARY REPORT 123 (Discussion
Draft, July 1992) [hereinafter GENDER BIAS REPORT].
90. A more complete survey of adversary filings is necessary in order to provide the
most accurate picture of the treatment of men and women in § 523(a)(5) dischargeability
disputes; that task, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(2) (1988).
92. Interview with Hon. Gerald D. Fines, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the Central Dis-
trict of Illinois (Dec. 29, 1992) (commenting that bankruptcy issues are being overtaken by
nonbankruptcy issues such as quasi-divorce matters and that the phenomenon contributes
to the increasing work load that bankruptcy judges face); Interview with Hon. Larry L.
Lessen, Chief Judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois (Jan. 11,
1993) (same); Interview with Hon. Robert J. Woodside, Chief Judge, U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (Oct. 29, 1992) (same).
93. See, eg., GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 89, at 123-27.
94. Id. at 123.
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expects women to remain home and "to give priority to the family."95
Moreover, when women pursue careers outside of the home, they often
find that the jobs they secure are lower in pay and/or lower in status than
the jobs men hold.96
Why are women more often than men living socially and economically
impoverished lives? Perhaps it is in part because women have been con-
ditioned to believe that jobs devoid of significant remuneration or station
are the only jobs available to them.97 In addition, it may be because true
equality will never become a reality if men and women continue to try to
resolve sexism in the workplace and in society by treating men and wo-
men identically. 98 As a result, "a proper understanding of equality must
take into consideration differences, must focus on public-policy out-
comes, and must see such public-policy issues within their social
context."99
The public policy underlying section 523(a)(5) of the Code insures that
all honest debtors receive a fresh start despite their past financial mis-
takes, while at the same time protecting creditors from dishonest debt-
ors."° Assuming for the purposes of this discussion that the debtor in
question is an honest person, gender difference should not be used as a
justification to award the wife the house and many of its contents and to
"award" the husband the bills and debts attendant with running the
household (i.e., the mortgage, car payments, and other consumer debts of
the family). Likewise, gender difference should not be used to award
each spouse relatively the same property and cash. Instead, courts should
consider gender difference when examining the reasons underlying why
the parties to a divorce are financially unequal in the first place.1 '
95. MARY LOu KENDRIGAN, Understanding Equality: The Public Policy Conse-
quences, in GENDER DIFFERENCES: THEIR IMPACr ON PUBLIC POLICY 1, 4 (Mary L. Ken-
drigen ed., 1991).
96. See id. at 4-5.
97. See id. at 4.
98. See MARY L. KENDRIGEN, Why Equality of Results?, in GENDER DIFFERENCES:
THEIR IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 95, at 221, 221-22.
99. See id. at 222.
100. See supra part III.
101. Professor Karen Gross quotes Diana Pearce (who is recognized by many as having
coined the phrase "feminization of poverty") to explain that poverty for men and women is
not the same: "'First, women's poverty is fundamentally different from that experienced by
men and second, women are subjected to programs designed for poor men. Poor women
find these programs are not only inadequate and inappropriate, but also lock them into a
life of poverty."' Gross, supra note 3, at 1533 n.97 (quoting Diana Pearce, Welfare Is Not
For Women: Toward a Model of Advocacy to Meet the Needs of Women in Poverty, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 412 (1985)).
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For example, one of the factors cited by both divorce courts, in deter-
mining the division of marital assets, and bankruptcy courts, in determin-
ing whether to discharge marital debts, is the "relative future earning
power of the spouse."'" Courts should reject the use of a mathematical
approach in evaluating the spouses' relative financial positions, thereby
arriving at some particular amount of debt, property, and/or cash that will
balance the interests of the parties. Rather, the courts should examine
the relationship that this particular husband and wife had and determine
why this wife earns less than this husband. °3 If the wife earns less be-
cause she lacks the same level of education and/or job experience as her
ex-husband due to the delay of her education and career to bear children,
she should be given the opportunity to seek a promotion or to gain addi-
tional knowledge by returning to school. If she chooses to go back to
school or wait for the next available and suitable promotion, the court
should recognize fully the wife's participation in the marriage. The hus-
band, therefore, would be required to support her for a reasonable period
of time while she "retools" or pursues a promotion. The husband's ac-
knowledgement of his ex-wife's contributions to their marriage should
not necessarily take only the traditional form of support, that is, monthly
payments for a set number of years. In addition, the fact that one partner
in the marriage subordinated her personal needs to those of the marriage
and family should be completely recognized."°
In Mary's hypothetical situation, the bankruptcy court should require
her ex-husband, John, to pay all of the marital debts, not allowing them to
be discharged in bankruptcy. This should include debts related to the
purchase of assets that are now in the wife's possession, even though he
will not presently benefit from that arrangement. Otherwise, John will
not have to pay anything to Mary or to their creditors and will, in all
102. Daulton v. Daulton, 139 B.R. 708, 710-11 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992) (finding that the
parties relative equal income was indicative that the fees in question were not in the nature
of alimony, maintenance, or child support and that, therefore, the fees were dischargea-
ble); AT THE BOUNDARIES OF THE LAW (Martha A. Fineman et al. eds., 1991).
103. See AMOTr & MATrHAEI, supra note 61, at 313 (asserting that an increasing
number of women are on their own and in poverty and citing statistics to evidence that
single-mother families have lower incomes and higher poverty rates than families headed
by a husband and a wife).
104. An interesting example of this type of analysis is Rump v. Rump, 150 B.R. 450
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993), where the court denied discharge of marital debt, relying in part
on the disparity between the spouses' incomes. Id. at 454. Furthermore, the court recog-
nized that the ex-husband had superior job skills, education, and training which demon-
strated that the income disparity would continue in the future. Id.
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likelihood, be able to keep the house, the car, and any other assets that he
was awarded under the divorce decree.
10 5
The consideration underlying an order requiring John (or any ex-hus-
band) to pay all of the marital debts is not limited to the present benefit
to Mary, but includes the recognition of Mary's sacrifice during the mar-
riage that allowed him to advance socioeconomically. This is not to say
that men who make less than their wives should not be given the same
opportunity; indeed, this proposal should apply to men and women
equally. However, this problem is one which most men, for several rea-
sons, simply do not have to face.106
An alternative to the current system of discharging marital debts in
bankruptcy involves redirecting the inquiry of the bankruptcy court.
Bankruptcy courts created several tests utilizing various factors to deter-
mine whether an agreement or a document is "in the nature of alimony,
105. The reality that John would be able to keep the couple's house and not have to pay
Mary her share of the equity is one that is lost on many women and men. The reason for
his ostensible windfall is that debt forgiveness and asset distribution are mutually exclusive
activities within bankruptcy. See generally JAMES J. WHITE & RAYMOND T. NIMMER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUrTCy 720-21 (2d ed. 1992). John may keep all assets in
which his equity interest does not exceed the applicable statutory exemption limit in his
jurisdiction. For example, the Code provides for an exemption in a debtor's homestead of
$7500. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (1988). As long as the debtor's equity does not exceed the
exemption amount and as long as she is willing to continue making payments to any se-
cured creditor holding the property as collateral, the debtor may keep the property in
question. Id. Consequently, in John's case, he could keep the house in question (by claim-
ing an exemption in his homestead), discharge his obligation to Mary (because of her fail-
ure to challenge the dischargeability of the marital debt) and not have to pay his ex-wife
her share of the equity in their former home.
106. In Carol Gilligan's famous study of sex-stereotyping socialization processes, the
author distinguishes the life experiences of women from those of men, calling on every
woman to assert herself and to claim responsibility for herself. GILLIGAN, supra note 41, at
82-83. Gilligan challenges women to adopt a "new kind of judgment, whose first demand is
for honesty." Id. She argues that women, who-because of socialization or because of
inherent biological and psychological differences between the sexes-rely on the men in
their lives to provide them with security, direction and an identity, are "perpetuating a
cycle of hurt" that has been visited upon them by divorce and that these women must
break free of that cycle. Id. at 61.
To be fair, not all feminists embrace Gilligan's view of the differences between men and
women. See, for example, Catharine MacKinnon's exchange with Carol Gilligan at the
State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, which has been published as Femi-
nist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 But'. L. REv. 11, 73-75
(1985). However, most would agree that Gilligan's book and her continuing research in
this area of feminist legal theory underscore the need for women's empowerment. The
only way power will be transferred from men to women is if women take power and not
wait for its conveyance. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983); Catharine A. MacKin-
non, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515
(1982); West, supra note 7.
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maintenance, or support9'107 or whether it is just a property settlement,
and thus dischargeable. 108 The factors that courts consider vary only
slightly and seem to turn on a bankruptcy court's ability to divine the true
intent of the divorcing parties and, arguably, the divorce court itself.0 9
Considerable time and energy, however, is misdirected in this pursuit.
VI. CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTIONS
The dischargeability discussions have thus far avoided the troubling
question of why the bankruptcy court should supplant its wisdom for that
of a divorce court. This question raises even more complicated questions:
Is the federal bankruptcy court violating the basic civil procedure princi-
ples of res judicata and collateral estoppel in addressing what appears to
be the same issues and/or claims that the state divorce court already ad-
dressed in distributing marital assets and obligations?" 0 Do principles of
equity extend so far as to void traditional legal doctrines, thereby (in the
context of a bankruptcy after a divorce) permitting debtors to rrelitigate
divorce issues with which they are unhappy?"'. When the bankruptcy
court determines whether marital debt is dischargeable, is it not just sub-
stituting its beliefs for those of the divorce court, and in some cases, the
parties?
Bankruptcy courts reason that they are not usurping the autonomy of
state courts to rule on family law matters. Instead, the courts assert that
107. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1988).
108. Id.
109. See infra notes 175-77.
110. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the res judicata argument in holding that
"the bankruptcy court is not confined to a review of the judgment and record in the prior
state-court proceedings when considering the dischargeability of respondent's debt."
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138-39 (1979), superseded by statute as stated in In re Rosen-
baum, 150 B.R. 994 (E.D. Tenn. 1993). The Brown Court reasoned that to hold otherwise
would undercut Congress' intention to commit dischargeability issues to the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court and would force premature litigation of speculative bankruptcy issues
in state courts ill-equipped to decide them. Id. at 134-36.
111. A debtor is often benefitted by being able to litigate an issue in the bankruptcy
court after receiving an unsatisfactory ruling in the state court. For example, the debtor in
In re Williams entered into a divorce agreement where he and his ex-spouse agreed to
divide up their debts. 3 B.R. 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). Pursuant to the divorce decree,
he was obligated to pay for the $2000 he owed on his car, $500 for his health club member-
ship, and about $900 in his share of credit card bills. Id. at 402. Subsequent to the divorce,
he filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and stopped paying the aforementioned debts. In a con-
tempt proceeding, the Superior Court of Georgia specifically ruled that the debts were not
a property settlement but were in the nature of support and maintenance and were thus
nondischargeable (presumably because they were joint debts). Id. However, just several
months later, the debtor was granted a discharge by a bankruptcy judge based on the same
facts. The bankruptcy court refused to adhere to the state court's earlier resolution of the
issue, citing Brown v. Felsen to refute the res judicata argument. Id. at 403-04.
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they are independently reviewing facts that may or may not have been
considered by the divorce court in order to resolve an issue that is pecu-
liarly within the province of the Bankruptcy Code: the dischargeability of
a debt. In resolving these issues, the bankruptcy courts are fulfilling Con-
gress' intent that they "look behind" a divorce agreement that designated
payments as alimony, maintenance, or support. 112 The issue before the
bankruptcy court is the dischargeability of marital debts, not the division
of marital property or whether or not one spouse is entitled to support
from the other. Moreover, the Constitution provides the federal courts
with exclusive jurisdiction to make this determination.
113
While the issues may be separated in theory, in reality, the bankruptcy
court's reasoning is open to debate because the court often reviews the
exact facts and issues that the divorce court has already reviewed, albeit
with its eye toward making sure there is an equitable distribution of fi-
nancial responsibility between a debtor-who has submitted to the juris-
diction of the court for that purpose-and his or her creditors. Indeed,
some of the factors created by the bankruptcy courts to assist in making
their dischargeability decisions are mirror images of the factors created
by the divorce courts to terminate marriages and divide marital assets."
4
This argument notwithstanding, the more serious problem existing in so-
ciety today is not just that the bankruptcy courts are affording a debtor
112. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988); In re Diers, 7 B.R. 18, 20 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1980).
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
114. Compare the 20 factors listed in Daulton v. Daulton, 139 B.R. 708, 710 (Bankr.
C.D. 11. 1992) (listed supra note 54), to the factors presented by Martha Albertson
Fineman and recognized throughout American legal culture as relevant to determining
property distribution at divorce. Those factors are:
1. The length of the marriage;
2. The property brought to the marriage by each party;
3. The "contribution" of each party to the marriage, often with the explicit ad-
monition that appropriate economic value is to be given to contributions of
homemaking and child-care services;
4. The contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning
power of the other;
5. Whether one of the parties has substantial assets not subject to division by the
court;
6. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties;
7. The earning capacity of each party, including educational background, train-
ing, employment skills, work experience, and length of absence from the job
market;
8. Custodial responsibilities for children;
9. The time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable a party to become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably com-
parable to that enjoyed during the marriage.
FINEMAN, supra note 6, at 40-41.
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"two bites at the same apple"; rather, it is that men are more likely to
receive the "two bites."
VII. CoNFLicr WITHIN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Even if the hypothetical Mary had filed an adversary proceeding
against John, she would have no assurance of prevailing against her ex-
husband, even though the language of section 523(a)(5) seems straight-
forward.115 Reported cases provide specific examples of women who suf-
fer twice when a marriage fails: first when they are divorced, and second
when certain marital debts are discharged by their former spouses. As an
illustration of the impact a discharge has on a woman following divorce,
consider the case of In re Seidel." 6 When Mr. and Mrs. Seidel divorced,
an Illinois divorce court approved the parties' agreement, which provided
for the following: Mr. Seidel was awarded the house and in exchange, he
agreed to assume approximately $10,500 in joint marital debts and hold
Mrs. Seidel harmless therefrom. Mrs. Seidel was awarded some house-
hold items and a 1976 Oldsmobile, and the parties expressly waived
maintenance.
117
There were no children resulting from the Seidel marriage, but two
children from a previous marriage lived with Mrs. Seidel. She earned $80
per week as a maid, had no savings, and received food stamps as her only
other source of income."18 At the time of the divorce Mr. Seidel earned
$250 per week but had subsequently become unemployed and earned
$202 per week in unemployment compensation."19 Three months after
the divorce, Mr. Seidel filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and sought
to discharge the debts he had agreed to pay pursuant to the divorce de-
cree.' 20 The bankruptcy court granted the discharge, holding that the
Seidels' judgment of dissolution was not in the nature of alimony, mainte-
nance, or support. The court's decision thereby made Mrs. Seidel solely
responsible for the full amount of the couple's marital debts.
121
Although the bankruptcy court stated that it considered nine separate
factors122 in reaching its decision, the dispositive factors were the listing
of Mr. Seidel's assumption of debts under a section in the agreement enti-
115. See supra part II; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
116. 48 B.R. 371 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1984).




121. Id. at 373-74.
122. Id. at 373. These factors were similar to the 20 factors outlined by the court in
Daulton v. Daulton, 139 B.R. 708, 710 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992) (listed supra note 54).
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tled "Property Settlement" and the specificity of the property division
itself."2 The court reasoned that the disparity in incomes did not indicate
that Mr. Seidel's assumption of debts was in the nature of support.
12 4
Furthermore, when considering the adequacy of support absent the debt
assumption, the court held that, "there was nothing to indicate that the
parties were concerned with alimony or maintenance. Mrs. Seidel ap-
peared to have possessed the wherewithal to provide for herself and her
children." 25
Likewise, in In re Norton,2 6 a Florida bankruptcy court reviewed the
request of the debtor's ex-wife (in her role as creditor) to except certain
marital debts from discharge. Again, the court ruled in favor of the
debtor/ex-husband, citing two specific factors in reaching its decision.'27
The Norton court stated the oft-repeated mantra in bankruptcy that
"[tihe question of what constitutes alimony or support is to be deter-
mined under the federal law and not state law," but then conceded that
"[the] [c]ourt must attempt to ascertain the parties' and the divorce
court's intent in determining whether an obligation created in a divorce
decree is dischargeable in bankruptcy."' 28 The court seemed most per-
suaded by the fact that the marital settlement agreement in question
made no mention of alimony provisions for Mrs. Norton,'29 and that the
agreement clearly indicated that it was a settlement in cash to compen-
sate Mrs. Norton for a loss in equity in a condominium property which
had been sold (the loss being attributable Mr. Norton's failed business
venture). 1
30
123. Seidel, 48 B.R. at 373. The agreement listed each household item that Mrs. Seidel
was to receive including, inter alia, "Tappan microwave oven and stand, a spinning wheel,
Gibson stereo, movie camera and projector, World Book set ... pots and pans, silverware,
white cabinet, 18-foot diameter above-ground swimming pool, [and a] 1976 Olds 98 auto-
mobile." Id. at 372.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 65 B.R. 140 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986).
127. Id. at 142.
128. Id.
129. Id. It is arguable that the failure of Mrs. Norton's divorce lawyer to include a
specific mention of alimony provisions and to safeguard her interests could constitute mal-
practice, which would explain the reason why these two women lost their dischargeability
challenges. However, it is also arguable that there were reasons other than malpractice
that motivated the lawyers to act as they did. In Rump v. Rump, for example, the ex-wife
testified before the bankruptcy court that she agreed to her ex-husband paying marital
debts in lieu of receiving any maintenance to which she would have been entitled because
"she believed that state and federal authorities would tax an award of maintenance, and
thereby reduce the amount of funds she would have had to pay the [debts] and the other
expenses of her and [her] two minor children." 150 B.R. 450, 454 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993).
130. Norton, 65 B.R. at 142.
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Like the Florida court in Norton, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit was called upon in Tilley v. Jessee"3' to ascertain
the intent of the parties to a divorce decree in order to determine the
dischargeability of marital debt. Even though the divorce occurred fif-
teen years earlier and both the bankruptcy court and the district court
previously held that the parties intended to create support payments, the
Fourth Circuit reversed, discharging the payments.
132
The Fourth Circuit case involved William Tilley and Joyce Jessee, mar-
ried in 1963 in Bristol, Tennessee. Eight years later, in 1971, they di-
vorced, at which time Tilley agreed in one provision of the post-nuptial
agreement to pay Jessee $1000 per month in alimony.1 33 In another sec-
tion of their post-nuptial agreement entitled "Property Interest of Wife in
Husband's Property and Estate," Tilley agreed to execute and deliver a
note to Jessee for $125,000 payable in quarterly installments at seven per-
cent interest.1 34 He was required to secure the note by obtaining life in-
surance and naming Jessee as the beneficiary. Fourteen years after the
divorce, Tilley filed for bankruptcy and sought to discharge the remaining
debt on the note, which totaled $32,000.131
In the bankruptcy court hearing, Tilley conceded that he assumed Jes-
see was using his payments on the note as support; the bankruptcy court
held these payments to be in the nature of support and thus nondis-
chargeable. 36 In making its determination, the bankruptcy court relied
on several factors, including: 1) the parties' intent at the time the post-
nuptial agreement was executed; 2) Jessee's ongoing medical require-
ments; 3) Jessee's perceived need to maintain her status in the commu-
nity; and 4) the fact that the note was secured by a life insurance policy
instead of the traditional mechanism of liens on real property utilized in
property settlements.
1 37
Tilley appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to the district court,
which upheld the ruling. 38 Tilley then appealed the decision to the
Fourth Circuit, which reversed the bankruptcy and district court decisions
131. 789 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1986).
132. Id. at 1078.
133. Id. at 1075.
134. Id. at 1076.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1077.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1077 n.2 (considering the factors of "(1) the financial circumstances and
needs of the parties when the obligation was created; (2) the function, purpose and sub-
stance of the obligation; and (3) whether the obligation is associated with the maintenance
or support of the non-debtor spouse." (citing In re Hawkins, 25 B.R. 430 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1982))).
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and held the debts to be dischargeable. 39 The circuit court ignored the
factors utilized by both the bankruptcy and district courts, instead consid-
ering only the intent of the parties at the time the agreement was
signed.'" The court opined that while Jessee intended the payment on
the note to be support, Tilley did not.' 4 ' Therefore, the parties lacked the
"mutual intent" necessary to make these payments in the nature of ali-
mony, maintenance, or support and the $32,000 debt Tilley owed Jessee
was discharged.' 42
A fourth and more recent example of the inequitable impact that bank-
ruptcy can have on women is found in Baker v. Baker. 43 In that case, the
bankruptcy court faced the question of whether to discharge a debtor/ex-
husband's obligation to pay a portion of his retirement income to his ex-
wife.'" The ex-wife's attorney drafted the sixteen-page divorce decree in
question, which contained a number of topic headings. 45 Under the
heading, "'Maintenance,"' the agreement required Mr. Baker to pay Ms.
Baker $400 monthly for two years following the effective date of the
agreement. Under another heading, "'Retirement Benefits,"' the agree-
ment provided that, "at the time the Debtor elects to retire and thus be-
come eligible for pension and profit sharing annuity benefits, the husband
shall pay to the wife 50% of his retirement pension and profit sharing
annuity benefits accrued as of the date of the dissolution of the mar-
riage.' 46 Subsequently, Mr. Baker retired and began to receive his re-
tirement pay.' 47 A short while later, he filed for bankruptcy protection
and his ex-wife sought an order in bankruptcy requiring Mr. Baker to pay
her the portion of the retirement and annuity that he was required to pay
under the divorce decree, notwithstanding the bankruptcy filing.'"
139. Id. at 1077-78.
140. Id. The circuit court was forced to ascertain what the intent of the parties had
been 15 years before, when they divorced. Id. at 1078. Even though both the bankruptcy
and district courts considered the intent of the parties at the time of the agreement, the
circuit court held their findings to be clearly erroneous. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 146 B.R. 862 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
144. Id. at 863.
145. Id. at 864-65. The topic headings include: "'Grounds for the Agreement,"'
"'Maintenance,"' "'Property Settlement,"' "'Furniture and Furnishings,"' "' Bank Ac-
counts,"' "'Automobiles,"' "'Miscellaneous Personal Property,"' "'Retirement Benefits,"'
"'Debts,"' "'Counsel Fees,"' and various other provisions. Id. at 865 (quoting marital
separation agreement).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 864.
148. Id. at 864-65.
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The bankruptcy court held that the retirement pay was not in the na-
ture of alimony, maintenance, or support, and was therefore dischargea-
ble.1 49 Although the court cited several factors that it claimed to have
considered in reaching its decision,5 0 the court seemed most persuaded
by the fact that Ms. Baker's attorney drafted the divorce decree.' 5 '
Although they rely on different factors to determine that a debtor/ex-
husband may discharge marital obligations that he was required to pay by
a divorce decree, Seidel, Norton, Tilley and Baker stand as reaffirmations
that the bankruptcy court is not the most appropriate place to determine
whether a marital debt should be discharged.' 52 Bankruptcy judges are
not the judges who heard the parties' testimony in the original divorce
proceeding, nor do they know with certainty how the parties intended to
characterize their obligations. Likewise, the bankruptcy court was not
able to observe the spouses when they testified so as to appreciate the
nonverbal messages communicated by the parties as well as the verbal.
These facts leave the bankruptcy court at a significant disadvantage in
trying to determine, at a later date, whether to deny discharge of marital
debts because they are in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support,
or to discharge them because they are merely part of a property
settlement.'
53
This Article does not suggest that the judges in each of the aforemen-
tioned cases were wrong in their analyses or that they misunderstood the
facts before them. This Article does suggest that, at best, bankruptcy
149. Id. at 866.
150. Id. The factors cited by the court are: "whether the obligation appears to balance
disparate incomes, whether the obligation is payable in installments or in a lump sum,
whether there was an actual need for support at the time it was awarded, and whether
there was a division of property and allocation of debts between the parties." Id.
151. Id. In concluding its Order, the court wrote:
The difficulty in this particular case is that the Agreement which, as noted ear-
lier, was prepared by Ms. Baker's attorney ... expressly waives any further claim
for maintenance other than the provisions of the Agreement which awarded to
her rehabilitative maintenance of $400.00 per month for a period of 24 consecu-
tive months. Moreover, the provision dealing with the Debtor's right to retire-
ment benefits was placed in a section of the Agreement dealing with the division
of the parties' property and debts. For these reasons, this Court is satisfied that
the obligation in question'is in the nature of a property settlement and, therefore,
dischargeable.
Id.
152. See Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074, 1077 (4th Cir. 1986); Baker, 146 B.R. at 865-66;
In re Norton, 65 B.R. 140, 141-42 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986); In re Seidel, 48 B.R. 371, 373-74
(Bankr. C.D. I11. 1984).
153. There is no doubt that people may make the same claim about divorce courts and
divorce court judges. In fact, it is arguable that state court judges are no "closer" to a
controversy between ex-spouses than federal judges are. However, that topic is best left to
another article.
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courts are making educated guesses about what the parties to the divorce
intended and, at worst, that Congress enacted a provision in the Code
that allows the traditional interpretations of res judicata and collateral
estoppel to be circumvented.1 54 The foregoing examples are not meant to
suggest that petitioning creditor ex-wives never win dischargeability dis-
putes in bankruptcy court;' 55 nor is it meant to suggest that wives are
never the debtors who successfully discharge marital debts.156 The case
law and statistics suggest, however, that ex-husbands are the debtors
more often than ex-wives and that men seek to discharge marital debts
more frequently than women.'
57
Case law also illustrates another problem: inconsistent rulings involving
cases with similar fact patterns. For example, in In re Elder,158 a Ken-
tucky bankruptcy court heard a complaint filed by a creditor ex-wife,
seeking to have her ex-husband's marital debt deemed nondischargeable
in his bankruptcy. The divorce decree in Elder provided, in part:
The Court further finds that Petitioner [ex-wife] is entitled to
part of Respondent's military retirement pay and that a just and
154. See supra part VI for a discussion of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
155. See, e.g., Rump v. Rump, 150 B.R. 450 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993). There, the bank-
ruptcy court held as nondischargeable the ex-husband's obligation to pay child support,
marital debts owed to third-party creditors, and his ex-wife's attorney's fees. Id. at 456. In
so ruling, the court relied on the disparity of income between the spouses, the fact that
(after the divorce) Ms. Rump had to support herself and the couple's two children while
Mr. Rump had to support only himself, and the ex-husband's "superior job skills, educa-
tion and training that would cause [the] marked disparity in incomes to continue into the
foreseeable future." Id. at 454; see also English v. English, 146 B.R. 874 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1992) (finding that the husband's divorce decree obligations for alimony, insurance premi-
ums, child support, and children's medical expenses were nondischargeable); Kearns v.
Liebner, 146 B.R. 847 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992) (holding that the husband's divorce decree
obligations for past due child support and maintenance were nondischargeable); In re
Stamper, 131 B.R. 433 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (stating that the husband's obligation to
make his ex-wife's car payment and maintain her car insurance was nondischargeable); In
re Borzillo, 130 B.R. 438 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (stating that the husband's obligation to
maintain life insurance for his ex-wife as beneficiary was nondischargeable); In re Kauf-
man, 115 B.R. 435 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the husband's obligation to pay
joint credit card debts and his ex-wife's legal fees expended to collect these payments was
nondischargeable); In re Brand, 108 B.R. 319 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989) (finding that the
husband's obligation to pay off joint credit card debts was nondischargeable).
156. See, e.g., In re Rios, 901 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that order of support was
not in the nature of child support); In re Lever, 137 B.R. 243 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992)
(stating that creditor ex-husband's attorney's fees had both dischargeable and nondis-
chargeable components); In re Mallin, 137 B.R. 673 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (finding that
debtor's hold-harmless obligation was dischargeable in light of her ex-husband's greater
earning potential).
157. See supra part IV for a more complete discussion on the statistical information
relating to this point.
158. 48 B.R. 414 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
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equitable distribution of this retirement pay would be $100.00
per month to Petitioner, with Petitioner to pay income tax on
that portion of retirement pay awarded to her, and that Respon-
dent ... is entitled to the balance.'5 9
In Elder, the bankruptcy court was persuaded by several key facts to
hold that the obligation to pay part of the ex-husband's retirement pay to
the wife was nondischargeable. First, the petitioner (ex-wife) was a na-
tive of Germany and had only the equivalent of a high school education;
second, the petitioner married her ex-husband in Germany in 1957, emi-
grated to the United States a year later, and became a citizen in 1970;
third, the petitioner had never worked outside of the home during the
couple's marriage and had no source of income other than that supplied
by her ex-husband; fourth, the petitioner was in poor health; and fifth, the
petitioner neither read nor wrote English well."6 On the other hand, the
debtor was a retired career serviceman who worked throughout the mar-
riage and received a military pension in addition to his current wage earn-
ings.16 The Elder court held that the obligation to pay one-fourth of the
debtor's retirement pay to his ex-wife was in the nature of support and
was therefore nondischargeable. 62
In In re Hall,'163 however, where an ex-wife petitioned a Florida bank-
ruptcy court to hold the debtor's obligation to pay pension benefits to the
ex-wife as nondischargeable in bankruptcy, the court reached the oppo-
site conclusion from the Elder court. In Hall, the total marital estate was
approximately $304,500, of which $250,000 was the actuarial value of the
debtor's pension.'" 4 The divorce court found that the ex-husband made
an irrevocable election to take the pension benefits in lifetime payments
and therefore could not receive a lump sum distribution. Thus, the court
ordered that, in addition to alimony already ordered in the case,' 65 the
petitioner (who earned approximately $600 per month) would receive an
additional $93,000 to be paid by conveyance of title to the marital home
and to certain other marital assets and by payments from the debtor to
his ex-wife of $400 per month for 156 months.
66
In later holding that the debtor's obligations were in the nature of a
property settlement and thus dischargeable in bankruptcy, the bank-
159. Id. at 415.
160. Id. at 416.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 417.
163. 40 B.R. 204 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984).
164. Id. at 205.
165. The previously ordered alimony was $240.00 per month. Id. at 206.
166. Id. at 205-06.
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ruptcy court in Hall stated that there was "no evidence to suggest that the
plaintiff [ex-wife] had significant medical problems, heavy personal debt,
or other unusual drains on her income. Therefore, it does not appear that
the plaintiff had a compelling need for support to meet her daily
needs."
1 67
It is difficult to imagine why the Elder court would find an award of
retirement income to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or sup-
port while the Hall court would not. One possible explanation is that the
Elder court felt that Ms. Elder lacked financial and/or social skills and
truly needed to be "supported." Another reason might be that the court
simply wanted to exercise its equitable powers to do what it thought was
fair under the circumstances, without really ever defining what "fairness"
meant. In Hall, on the other hand, the court may have felt that Ms. Hall
was self-sustaining and did not need additional financial "support." To
put it another way, the court in Elder was saying that Ms. Elder needed to
be "taken care of by her ex-husband" while the court in Hall found that
Ms. Hall did not.
The Elder and Hall cases notwithstanding, the primary justification for
vesting the bankruptcy courts with jurisdiction over the section 523(a)(5)
dischargeability issues is the promotion of a uniform application of the
law, thereby reducing forum shopping and uncertainty. 6 ' However, as
the federal courts of the various circuits are forced to resolve these dis-
chargeability conflicts, a patchwork of approaches results that is anything
but uniform.
To resolve the ultimate conflict of whether a debt is a property settle-
ment or represents alimony, maintenance, or support, most courts rely to
some extent on extrinsic factors beyond the couple's divorce decree. In
articulating what factors they consider to be important in determining the
dischargeability of a debt, the federal courts reveal divergent approaches.
Some courts consider the "totality of the evidence" when resolving a
dischargeability question under section 523(a)(5) and do not list any spe-
cific factors relied on to reach their decision.' 69 Other courts rely on rela-
tively short lists of specific factors that they consider to be pertinent in
167. Id. at 206.
168. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text; supra part VI.
169. See, e.g., In re Gibson, 61 B.R. 997, 999 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986).
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resolving the dischargeability issue,17 ° while some rely on more compre-
hensive lists of factors.
171
170. See In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1990). The Gianakas court rejected the
15 factors utilized in a prior Pennsylvania state court decision. See Buccino v. Buccino, 580
A.2d 13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). Instead, it relied on the following three principal indicators:
1) the language and substance of the agreement in the context of surrounding circum-
stances, using extrinsic evidence if necessary; 2) the parties' financial circumstances at the
time of the settlement; and 3) the function served by the obligation at the time of the
divorce or settlement. Gianakas, 917 F.2d at 762-63.
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit relied on four factors
in making its determination. In re Goin, 808 F.2d 1391, 1392 (10th Cir. 1987); see also In re
Palm, No. 91-8072, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18025 (10th Cir. Aug. 5, 1992) (using the four
factors listed in Goin). But see Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989)
(listing seven factors used to determine dischargeability). The four Goin factors are:
(1) if the agreement fails to provide explicitly for spousal support, the court may
presume that the property settlement is intended for support if it appears under
the circumstances that the spouse needs support; (2) when there are minor chil-
dren and an imbalance of income, the payments are likely to be in the nature of
support; (3) support or maintenance is indicated when the payments are made
directly to the recipient and are paid in installments over a substantial period of
time; and (4) an obligation that terminates on remarriage or death is indicative of
an agreement for support.
Goin, 808 F.2d at 1392-93 (citing Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1984)).
171. In re Stone, 79 B.R. 633, 638 (Bankr. D. Md. 1987) (utilizing the 18 factors listed in
In re Coffman, 52 B.R. 667, 674-75 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985)). The 18 factors listed by the
Stone court were:
(1) Whether there was an alimony award entered by the state court.
(2) Whether there was a need for support at the time of the decree; whether the
support award would have been inadequate absent the obligation in question.
(3) The intention of the court to provide support.
(4) Whether debtor's obligation terminates upon death or remarriage of the
spouse or a certain age of the children or any other contingency such as a change
in circumstances.
(5) The age, health, work skills, and educational levels of the parties.
(6) Whether the payments are made periodically over an extended period or in a
lump sum.
(7) The existence of a legal or moral "obligation" to pay alimony or support.
(8) The express terms of the debt characterization under state law.
(9) Whether the obligation is enforceable by contempt.
(10) The duration of the marriage.
(11) The financial resources of each spouse, including income from employment
or elsewhere.
(12) Whether the payment was fashioned in order to balance disparate incomes
of the parties.
(13) Whether the creditor spouse relinquished rights of support in payment of
the obligation in question.
(14) Whether there were minor children in the care of the creditor spouse.
(15) The standard of living of the parties during their marriage.
(16) The circumstances contributing to the estrangement of the parties.
(17) Whether the debt is for a past or future obligation, any property division, or
any allocation of debt between the parties.
(18) Tax treatment of the payment by the debtor spouse.
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Not only do the circuits differ as to factors they rely on,'7 2 courts within
a circuit also use differing criteria.173 Perhaps the clearest example of the
lack of uniformity is when federal courts disagree on the analysis to be
utilized within the same case.
1 74
This lack of consistency between federal courts in relation to the
number of factors they utilize to assess section 523(a)(5) dischargeability
issues frustrates the objective of a uniform application of bankruptcy law.
The goal of uniformity is further eroded by the methods these courts use
to apply the factors they list as critical. Courts that list a set of factors
they rely on are not required to hear and assess evidence on every one. 75
Conversely, the factors that courts lay out often do not represent a com-
prehensive list of all the factors they may consider.' 76  Additionally,
bankruptcy courts are not constrained by any fixed hierarchy in consider-
ing what importance should be placed on each factor. 177 The lack of con-
Stone, 79 B.R. at 638 (citing Coffinan, 52 B.R. at 674-75); see also In re Combs, 101 B.R.
609, 615-16 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (listing eight factors); In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1108
n.7 (6th Cir. 1983) (listing nine factors); Friedman v. Silberfein, 138 B.R. 778, 780 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992) (listing eight factors); In re Peterson, 133 B.R. 508 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991)
(listing 18 factors); In re Hall, 119 B.R. 272, 275-76 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (listing eight
factors).
172. See supra note 170 for a comparison of differing circuits.
173. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provides an example
of a jurisdiction with conflicting analysis. A comparison of a few cases addressing the dis-
chargeability provision under section 523(a)(5) indicates the less-than-uniform application
of factors. In re Woods, 561 F.2d 27, 30 (7th Cir. 1977) (utilizing four factors); In re Coil,
680 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating the Woods factors are not sufficient); Daulton
v. Daulton, 139 B.R. 708, 710 (Bankr. C.D. I11. 1992) (listing 20 factors to be considered);
In re Mitchell, 132 B.R. 585, 587 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (utilizing six factors).
174. As an example, the bankruptcy court in In re Davidson, 104 B.R. 788, 794-95
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989), affd, 133 B.R. 795 (N.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 947
F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1991), relied on 12 factors drawn from several cases to find a debt to be
dischargeable. On appeal, the district court affirmed, citing eight factors in its analysis. In
re Davidson, 133 B.R. 795, 798-99 (N.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 947 F.2d 1294
(5th Cir. 1991).
Similarly, in Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1986), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit discussed how the district court took into consideration
"certain additional factors" which had been utilized by other courts but had not been ad-
dressed in the bankruptcy court's decision, Id. at 1077. The Fourth Circuit then reversed
on other grounds. Id.
175. In re McCauley, 105 B.R. 315, 319 (E.D. Va. 1989).
176. In re Coil, 680 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1982) (considering four factors from
Woods, 561 F.2d at 30, but indicating that these factors were not all inclusive); In re
Balvich, 135 B.R. 327, 333 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.) (identifying four factors but stating that they
were not "exhaustive or necessarily determinative"), affd, 135 B.R. 323 (N.D. Ind. 1991);
In re Mitchell, 132 B.R. 585, 587 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (listing six factors but stating that these
were not exhaustive).
177. McCauley, 105 B.R. at 319 (assigning no precise weights to the factors; determina-
tion was held to be within the discretion of the trier of fact).
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sistency in the factors federal courts use to assess section 523(a)(5) issues,
coupled with the wide discretion courts possess to create ad hoc hierar-
chies of importance, strongly contravenes the notion that the federal
courts are applying the law uniformly or that there is one federal
standard.
Aside from the discrepancies concerning the use of the various factors,
other inconsistencies also arise. The intent of the parties at the time of
divorce or settlement is a key element in resolving the dischargeability
issue in most of these cases. This element, however, is given varying
treatment in different federal courts. Many courts rely on their lists of
factors to find the intent of the parties,17 while others consider the intent
of the parties a threshold issue which may preclude further inquiry. 79
This dichotomy of approaches was confronted by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Colorado in Sampson v. Sampson. 8 ° The
Sampson court was forced to reconcile two conflicting decisions within its
own circuit.' Ultimately, the court chose to look behind the parties'
written agreement even though it was unambiguous-in accordance with
one conflicting decision and in contravention of the other.
182
As the previous paragraph indicates, "intent" is a critical element in
resolving the issue of dischargeability. There are, however, conflicting
178. See, e.g., In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759, 762 (3rd Cir. 1990); Sylvester v. Sylvester,
865 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989); Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1984);
Friedman v. Silberfein, 138 B.R. 778, 780 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also In re Calhoun,
715 F.2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir. 1983) (recognizing the intent of the parties as a threshold
issue but utilizing an assessment of the factors to establish intent).
179. Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074, 1077 (4th Cir. 1986). In Tilley, both the bankruptcy
court and the district court considered numerous factors from which they concluded that
the parties had intended to create a nondischargeable support obligation. The Fourth Cir-
cuit however reversed, finding no proof of mutual intent in the record. Id. at 1078. Be-
cause the circuit court was not convinced that the parties mutually intended to create
support payments, it found it unnecessary to consider the factors relied on by the district
court. Id. at 1078 n.4. The Fourth Circuit court reasoned that, "[i]ntent clearly remains the
threshold that must be crossed before any other concerns become relevant." Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874
(10th Cir. 1986), also viewed the intent of the parties as a threshold issue. The Yeates court
reasoned that if the parties' written agreement unambiguously showed their intent, then
that evidence was persuasive and normally controlling, thus requiring no further inquiry
into extrinsic evidence. Id. at 878.
180. 142 B.R. 957 (D. Colo. 1992), aff'd, 997 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1993).
181. The Sampson court considered In re Goin, 808 F.2d 1391, 1392 (10th Cir. 1987)
(focusing on the extrinsic evidence to find intent of the parties), and Yeates, 807 F.2d at 874
(stating that no extrinsic evidence should be considered if the parties' intent is unambigu-
ously stated in the written agreement), as irreconcilable. Sampson, 142 B.R. at 958. The
Sampson court saw these decisions as two "ships passing in the night" and opined that
further clarification by the court of appeals would be of great help. Id. at 959.
182. Sampson, 142 B.R. at 958.
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views among the federal courts as to whose "intent" the reviewing court
must establish. Many courts agree that it is the intent of the parties that is
dispositive, 83 while others focus on the intent of the state divorce
court. 84 Still others look to both the parties' and the state court's intent
in varying degrees.'85
Most federal courts do not consider the parties' changed circumstances
at the time of the bankruptcy filing in making their dischargeability deter-
minations. This approach, however, is not uniformly followed. The
United states Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit now stands alone as
the only circuit that considers this factor.
86
Other legal doctrines underscore the likelihood that the uncertainty
and nonuniformity among the circuits will be maintained in this area of
the law, namely, collateral estoppel and abstention. 87 The Fifth Circuit
held that collateral estoppel may bar debtors from claiming a debt to be
dischargeable as a property settlement when they have deducted the pay-
ments as alimony on their tax returns. 88 Cases in other jurisdictions
have made no mention of whether debtors were deducting payments
from earned income on their tax returns. This threshold defense that the
183. In re Combs, 101 B.R. 609, 615 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865
F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226, 1229 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 986, and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981); In re Hall, 119 B.R. 272, 276 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1990).
184. See In re Mitchell, 132 B.R. 585, 587 (S.D. Ind. 1991); In re McCauley, 105 B.R.
315, 318 (E.D. Va. 1989) (finding that the bankruptcy court's task was to ascertain the
intent of the state court judge while the intent of the parties was irrelevant); see also In re
Peterson, 133 B.R. 508, 512 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that the state court's intent is
only one of many factors to be considered).
185. Compare In re Coil, 680 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that the intent of
the parties or the state court must be determined) and In re Haas, 129 B.R. 531, 536
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that the intent of the parties or the state court must be
determined) with In re Hart, 130 B.R. 817, 849 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991) (holding that the
intent of parties and state court must be determined).
186. Frisbee v. Frisbee, 144 B.R. 839, 840 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992) (citing In re Cal-
houn, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983)); see also In re Stone, 79 B.R. 633, 641-50 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1987) (rejecting Calhoun's doctrine of consideration of a party's present ability to pay
and, in Appendix "A" of the decision, surveying all circuits to conclude that the Sixth
Circuit stood alone with the possible exception of the Tenth Circuit). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, rejected the Calhoun doctrine in Sylves-
ter, 865 F.2d at 1164. See also William H. Brown, The Impact of Bankruptcy on Alimony,
Maintenance, and Support Obligations: The Approach in the Sixth Circuit, 56 TEN. L.
REv. 507, 508 (1989) (stating that the Sixth Circuit was unique in its approach).
187. In addition to the employment of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, discussed in
this paragraph, the doctrine of abstention has been employed by bankruptcy courts to re-
fuse to hear marital debt dischargeability questions. For a more complete discussion of this
issue, see infra part X.
188. See In re Davidson, 947 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Robinson, 122 B.R.
502, 506 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
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Fifth Circuit recognized provides an ex-spouse creditor with a new
weapon that may or may not become useful in other jurisdictions.
VIII. CASE LAW ILLUSTRATIONS
Case law also provides examples of how a woman's participation in the
adversary bankruptcy procedure can exact a tremendous toll. Women
often lose in bankruptcy even when they "win" the dischargeability issue.
The discretion that section 523(a)(5) vests the bankruptcy court with in
designating payments as either alimony or as a property settlement is an
open invitation to debtors to at least attempt to discharge the marital
debts in question. Debtors pondering this decision can only be en-
couraged by the tremendous uncertainty created by the conflicting court
decisions in this area. Many male debtors who file for bankruptcy follow-
ing divorce realize that their ex-wives often will not have the financial
resources to challenge their discharge and use this fact as leverage to
force favorable settlements. The ambiguity of section 523(a)(5), the un-
certainty and unpredictability of court decisions, and the weak financial
position of many ex-wives following a divorce are all factors which seem
to entice the debtor to seek the discharge.
For example, on March 30, 1983, David and Nancy Davidson were di-
vorced. 189 Pursuant to their divorce decree, Mr. Davidson agreed to pay
his ex-wife $7732 per month for 121 months.190 After making thirty-
seven payments, Mr. Davidson stopped making payments in July of 1986,
and in March of 1988 he filed for bankruptcy.' 9 ' Even though: 1) the
divorce decree expressly stated the support obligation was not a property
settlement;"9 2) Mr. Davidson labelled his checks to Nancy as "alimony";
3) Mr. Davidson deducted the payments as alimony on his income tax
returns; and 4) Mrs. Davidson declared the checks as alimony income on
her tax returns, Mr. Davidson nonetheless argued that the money was not
alimony and attempted to discharge the debt as a property settlement.
93
On July 1, 1988, (after going two years with no support payments), Mrs.
Davidson initiated an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court to object
to her ex-husband discharging the marital debts. On August 30, 1989,
(after thirty-seven months without support), the bankruptcy court found
189. See In re Davidson, 133 B.R. 795,796 (N.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 947
F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1991).
190. Id. at 797.
191. Id.
192. The divorce decree stated: "The support obligation ... is unrelated to the division
of marital property... and is not intended in any way to constitute a form of payment to
Wife for any rights or interest she may have in the marital properties of the parties." Id.
193. Id.
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the entire debt to be dischargeable.' 94 Mrs. Davidson appealed to the
federal district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling.' 95
She further appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, which held on December 2, 1991 (after sixty-five
months with no support payments) that the debt was in fact nondis-
chargeable 196 and ordered payment. 197
Under a purely statistical analysis, the Davidson case would represent
a "win" for a female ex-spouse creditor because the debt was ultimately
ruled to be nondischargeable, but at what cost? Considering the fragile
financial underpinnings upon which many women stand following a di-
vorce, how many could have mustered the financial resources to sustain
such a prolonged battle? The current language of section 523(a)(5) pro-
motes litigation and, as a consequence, women in dire financial straits are
often forced to expend time and money just to preserve the status quo
when an ex-husband seeks to discharge his obligations. Unlike those wo-
men who ultimately find some solace in the fact that they successfully
prevented the discharge, women who are unsuccessful in preventing a dis-
charge are often left destitute.
198
The assertion that section 523(a)(5)'s discharge provision perpetuates
unfair economic discrimination against women does not depend on prov-
ing that ex-husbands discharge more debts in post-divorce bankruptcies
than ex-wives. While this statistical disparity might provide insight into
the fairness of the adversary proceeding rulings themselves, it ignores the
devastating practical impact each of these legal confrontations has on the
participants. Therefore, even when a woman "wins" by preventing an ex-
husband from discharging the debt he had agreed to pay her in their di-
194. Id. at 797-98.
195. Id. at 795.
196. The court found that David had set up "an intricate and unambiguous divorce
settlement" and had taken advantage of the characterization of the payments as alimony
for tax purposes. Because of his actions, the court reasoned that David was collaterally
estopped from now arguing that the payments were not alimony. In re Davidson, 947 F.2d
1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1991).
197. Because the divorce decree stipulated that a party who defaulted on an obligation
must pay the other party's legal fees in pursing compliance, the court awarded Nancy's
legal fees and held that these fees were so intertwined with the support payments that they
were also nondischargeable. Id. at 1297-98. But see Adams v. Zentz, 963 F.2d 197 (8th Cir.
1992) (finding that legal fees awarded to an ex-husband who successfully challenged his ex-
wife's refusal to comply with custody agreement was a dischargeable debt when the ex-wife
filed for bankruptcy).
198. The author does not suggest that women are the only victims under § 523(a)(5) of
the Code. However, there appears to be no literature reporting the same kind of injustice
or inequity affecting men.
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vorce decree, her requisite temporal and financial costs often result in a
hollow victory.
IX. RESHAPING MARITAL DEBT DISCHARGE
To examine gender and its social significance requires that equal value
be conferred on the different ways in which humans speak and that ap-
propriate consideration be afforded to all of the various experiences that
men and women bring to identification of issues and to problem solving.
This consideration is not limited to spouses or their lawyers, but also ex-
tends to the persons making the decisions that affect the parties. In the
context of bankruptcy law, the participants in the judicial appointment
process need "to seek [bankruptcy] judges with varied life experiences
[and] judges with the potential for a better understanding of the multi-
tude of perspectives that are likely to be placed before them in the court-
room."'199 While women systematically have been denied choices and
power by the legal system in this country, to give them access to the seats
of power, yet limit their method of exercising it, is to give them no choice
at all.2 °
199. Patricia A. Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment On Feminist Theory and Judg-
ing, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1945, 1950 (1988).
200. Indeed, one explanation for the apparent disparity between ex-wives and ex-hus-
bands under § 523(a)(5) concerns the perceptions and perspectives of the bankruptcy
bench. Their gender may not allow for a recognition and complete examination of the
"female experience" in our culture. In 1992, there were 291 bankruptcy judges in the
United States. 28 U.S.C. § 152 (1988). The Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-361, 106 Stat. 965, authorized the creation of 35 additional permanent and temporary
judgeships. Until just recently, however, Congress had not appropriated funding for those
new positions. See Pub. L. No. 103-121, 107 Stat. 1153 (1993). In 1992, only 40 of the 291
bankruptcy judges were women. Telephone Interview with Susan Dorwaldt, Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts, Bankruptcy Division (Oct. 24, 1992). Inclusion of
this statistic is not intended to dismiss the discussion concerning inequality as simply a
"number problem" or to suggest that only women are qualified to bestow equal treatment
upon women. Rather, it is to state that many experiences of women are so unique to
women that they are the only ones who can truly understand the woman's position in the
world and the second-class treatment women receive. As Professor Catharine MacKinnon
asserts:
A few husbands are like most wives-financially dependent on their spouse....
[However,] [t]o be poor, financially dependent, and a primary parent constitutes
part of what being a woman means.... A gender-neutral approach to those cir-
cumstances obscures, while the protectionist approach declines to change, the fact
that women's poverty, financial dependency, motherhood, and sexual accessibility
... substantively make up women's status as women.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 73
(1987).
Professor MacKinnon does not suggest, nor would it be reasonable to propose, that all
bankruptcy judges be women because that is the only way ex-wives can successfully chal-
lenge their ex-husbands' attempts to discharge marital debts. However, she does argue
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:351
In the context of a bankruptcy and, more particularly, the discharge of
marital debts, differences between men and women must be acknowl-
edged and accepted. Those differences notwithstanding, the woman in an
inferior bargaining position must be able to access and engage competent
counsel for advice concerning not only the immediate (divorce) ramifica-
tions of the termination of her marriage and settlement with her ex-hus-
band, but also the potential long term (bankruptcy) ramifications of the
dissolution.
20 1
that women are clearly victims of a male-oriented, male-dominated interpretation of equal-
ity and therefore, a significant change is necessary. Immediately adding women to the
bankruptcy bench can only improve women's overall fortune in bankruptcy. The percent-
age of female bankruptcy judges (currently 13.75%) should equal the percentage of women
in the United States (currently 51.2%, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 59, tbl. 13, at
14), or at least mirror the percentage of women who utilize the bankruptcy system.
The "dominance" discussion, as it has been characterized by legal scholars, is as much
about consciousness raising as it is about immediate change. Realistically, it is unlikely
that such a change in the bankruptcy judiciary will occur soon. The bankruptcy court sys-
tem is but one of many institutions where males seem firmly entrenched and where radical
change, such as making the next 126 bankruptcy appointments all women, would be vigor-
ously opposed. Compare the problem of fully integrating the judiciary to Board of Direc-
tors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (holding that a state law
requiring "business establishment[s]" not to exclude persons on the basis of gender, was
not violative of the First Amendment's freedom of association clause), and Isbister v. Boys'
Club, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985) (excluding females from private all-male associations
successfully challenged on equal protection grounds).
The number of female bankruptcy judges, however, clearly represents a problem in our
society. For a court of equity to be of "right, Dust] or moral quality" requires that all
members of the society be given an opportunity to participate and to be heard. See
Fineman, supra note 58, at 730 (arguing in the context of child custody determinations).
Indeed, judges should not be disqualified from a case because they cannot be totally impar-
tial to the controversies before them; they should not be automatically disqualified for
being partial and dependent. See Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of
the Aspirations For Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988). Professor Resnik states
that judges should be involved, engaged, and interdependent so that there is less distance
between judges and their judgments. Id. at 1943-44. Institutional insulation of decision-
makers from their decisions does not necessarily lead to "more justice" because the pres-
ent system is fraught with examples of racial and gender bias, notwithstanding the claimed
impartiality of the judiciary. Id. at 1903-04.
201. Women are entitled to education by competent counsel to discuss alternatives
when their marriages are being dissolved and their lives disassembled. "Competence" re-
quires divorce counsel to be knowledgeable in both family law and bankruptcy law, and it
requires bankruptcy counsel to be familiar with family law. "Competence" also requires
family law and bankruptcy counsel to ask what Professor Katherine Bartlett has identified
as "Asking the Woman Question." Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103
HARV. L. REV. 829, 837 (1990).
"Asking the Woman Question" requires one to view situations in terms of the gender-
based pain and oppression experienced by women in society. Id. at 847. Professor Bartlett
actually characterizes "Asking the Woman Question" as being comprised of seven
questions:
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This entire discussion of the value of "maleness" versus "femaleness"
should not be construed to mean that one gender's experiences must be
"brought up to the level of" another gender's experiences."° Rather, it
requires that both parties to a divorce protect themselves while balancing
personal protection against the need to serve their underlying goal: to
work together to end a marriage and to divide the remnants of that mar-
riage in an equitable manner.
"(1) What have been and what are now all women's experiences of the 'Life Situ-
ation' addressed by the doctrine, process, or area of law under examination? (2)
What assumptions, descriptions, assertions and/or definitions of experience-
male, female, or ostensibly gender neutral-does the law make in this area?...
(3) What is the area of mismatch, distortion, or denial created by the differences
between women's life experiences and the law's assumptions or imposed struc-
tures? ... (4) What patriarchal interests are served by the mismatch? ... (5) What
reforms have been proposed in this area of law or women's life situation? How
will these reform proposals, if adopted, affect women both practically and ideo-
logically? ... (6) In an ideal world, what would this woman's life situation look
like, and what relationship, if any, would the law have to this future life situation?
.... and (7) How do we get there from here?"
Id. at 837 n.24 (quoting Heather R. Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64, 72-77 (1985) (omissions in original)).
"Asking the Woman Question" does not require all problems to be resolved in favor of the
female participant in a dispute. Rather, it compels people to analyze the social significance
of gender, considering the impact of women's experiences. As Professor Bartlett writes:
Asking the woman question does not require decision in favor of a woman.
Rather, the method requires the decisionmaker to search for gender bias and to
reach a decision in the case that is defensible in light of that bias. It demands, in
other words, special attention to a set of interests and concerns that otherwise
may be, and historically have been, overlooked. The substance of asking the wo-
man question lies in what it seeks to uncover: disadvantage based upon gender.
Id. at 846-47. Moreover, bankruptcy reform in this area also requires changing the types of
questions that are asked by the bankruptcy court. As previously discussed herein, bank-
ruptcy courts create tests with various factors to determine whether an agreement or docu-
ment is "in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support" or whether it is just a property
settlement. The factors which the courts consider vary only slightly and seem to turn on a
bankruptcy court's ability to divine the true intent of the divorcing parties and, arguably
the divorce court. Considerable time and energy is misdirected in this pursuit. The courts
should adopt a test that mirrors Professor Bartlett's "Asking the Woman Question."
202. Historically, differences between the sexes are not defined in terms of distinctions
between men and women, but in terms of how women are unlike men. Many battles are
waged over whether women should be allowed to compete as equals to men notwithstand-
ing their "differences." See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding the
constitutionality of exclusion of women from draft registration because women are not fit
for combat); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974) (stating that the exclusion of
pregnancy from risks covered by state employees' insurance plan does not constitute sex
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause because the plan did not discriminate
between women and men but between "pregnant women" and "non-pregnant persons");
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that the state of Idaho could not presumptively
deny women the right to administer estates).
However, in recent years the debate has been refined. See supra note 80 (quoting Pro-
fessor Joan Williams).
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For example, student advocates at The Dickinson School of Law Fam-
ily Law Clinic in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, have become increasingly more
sensitive to the plight of women after divorce and the likelihood that
bankruptcy, which might negatively affect their client, may follow. Con-
sequently, the students have added "protective" language in the docu-
ment that determines the distribution of assets in a divorce. Their "Order
of Court re: Equitable Distribution of Marital Property" affords an extra
measure of security to the client (usually the woman) against a devastat-
ing bankruptcy which could cause an ex-spouse to assume certain joint
obligations from the marriage, subsequently forcing her to file for bank-
ruptcy. That language states: "Should defendant [ex-spouse] discharge
any or all joint debts in bankruptcy, this agreement shall become void and
plaintiff will maintain her right to assert her alimony claim notwithstand-
ing finality of divorce."2 '3 This language is not intended as a cure-all;2"
it is, however, intended to enlighten both spouses to the reality that the
end of their marriage, or their physical and emotional bond, is not neces-
sarily the end of their financial bond. The clause also functions to inform
them that counsel must safeguard against the premature or inequitable
destruction of this financial bond.
If the bankruptcy bench and bar are unable to "re-think" the way(s) in
which women are affected by bankruptcy, particularly as creditors, then
the entire marital-debt-dischargeability process must be restructured.
Congressional legislation of a division of responsibility regarding the dis-
charge of marital debts would serve as a viable alternative in the attempt
to raise the consciousness of all interested parties.
The bankruptcy court is simply not the proper forum within which to
address family law issues. Too much time often passes between the di-
vorce and the bankruptcy filing. Moreover, the bankruptcy courts do not
want to crowd their dockets with matters that seem only tangentially re-
lated to bankruptcy law, and the divorced couple must often expend sub-
stantial time and money in order to bring the bankruptcy court "up to
speed" before it can even consider the bankruptcy/divorce question in-
volved in any adversarial dispute. The responsibility to make additional
inquiry into the marital relationship at issue should be borne by the di-
vorce court, not the federal judiciary. The quid pro quo must be, how-
203. See The Dickinson School of Law Family Law Clinic Form: "Order of Court re:
Equitable Distribution of Marital Property."
204. Cf. In re Reichuber, 104 B.R. 377 (D. Kan. 1989) (stating that the mere fact that
the wife had the option of converting property settlement payments from her husband into
maintenance in the event of his a default was not sufficient to except those payments from
her husband's bankruptcy discharge).
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ever, to rewrite section 523(a)(5) of the Code to remove completely the
federal court's involvement in this issue.2°5
A simplified marital-debt-dischargeability provision would serve wo-
men, men, and the bankruptcy court system more effectively. The modi-
fied approach would surrender traditional "family law" disputes to the
divorce courts and require bankruptcy courts to decide only the "bank-
ruptcy" question: whether the debt in question is dischargeable. Di-
vorced women would be in an improved position if the discussion of
whether a divorce decree or marital settlement agreement was "fair" was
conducted in the courtroom where the document was first approved.
There, an acute examination into the relationship of the divorcing parties
could be conducted. A more appropriate version of section 523(a)(5)
would require the bankruptcy court to refuse to discharge any debt to a
spouse, ex-spouse, or child of the debtor, which was reduced to judgment
by a court of competent jurisdiction and which arose out of a separation
or divorce or out of an action for alimony or support.
By redefining section 523(a)(5) as a provision that recognizes divorce
courts as the final arbiters of marital disputes, a bankrupt spouse must
return to the divorce court for modification or elimination of alimony,
maintenance, or support. There would be no "second bite at the apple"
in bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court's involvement in the marriage
or dissolution of the marriage of the debtor and his or her former spouse
would be minimal.' Jurisdiction over the issue of the extent to which
the marital debt in question should be reduced or forgiven altogether
would lie solely with the divorce court.20 7 The bankruptcy court would
205. Jane Singer recently called for similar amendments to the Code, asserting that re-
cent developments in family law undermine the Code's attempt to differentiate between
alimony and/or support obligations and property settlements. See Jane B. Singer, Divorce
Obligations and Bankruptcy Discharge: Rethinking the Support/Property Distinction, 30
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 43, 45-47 (1993).
206. The inquiry of the bankruptcy court would be, "Was this debt the result of a judg-
ment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction? If so, the debt is nondischargeable. If
not, the debt is discharged, unless some other provision of the Code applies and would
prevent the debt from being discharged."
207. Currently, marital debt dischargeability questions are generally resolved in the
bankruptcy court, but the court's jurisdiction over these matters is held concurrently by the
bankruptcy court and "any appropriate nonbankruptcy forum." FED. R. BANKR. P.
4007(b) (advisory committee's note) (1988); see also Sheryl L. Scheible, Bankruptcy and
the Modification of Support: Fresh Start, Head Start, or False Start?, 69 N.C. L. REv. 577,
625 (1991). The dischargeability issues usually reach a state court (the most common
"nonbankruptcy forum") after the debtor's bankruptcy is complete, hence the bankruptcy
court never addresses the nature of the marital debt(s) in question. Id. at 626. Therefore,
it is already possible for a divorce court to hear and resolve dischargeability questions.
This Article is not proposing to increase the power of the divorce courts, but to limit the
power of the bankruptcy courts.
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simply order that the debtor must pay all of the debts that the divorce
court ordered paid. If the debtor is without funds to pay the debt, or if a
modification of the divorce court's order is necessary to provide the
debtor with temporary or permanent relief, the debtor spouse would be
free to return to the state divorce court and ask for such relief.
20 8
This proposed shift in the focus of section 523(a)(5) from the bank-
ruptcy court to a state court is not unprecedented. One need only look to
neighboring subsections of section 523 of the Code for comparison.20 9
Unlike the marital obligations covered by section 523(a)(5), other debts
excepted from discharge are more straightforward; the dischargeability
analyses with regard to these debts does not seem to require a second
inquiry into a subjective matter such as the intent of the parties.
Section 523(a)(7) for example, excepts from discharge debts for fines,
penalties, and forfeitures payable to and for the benefit of a governmen-
tal unit.210 The bankruptcy court is not required to evaluate the underly-
ing reason for the debt, but denies the discharge after it objectively
determines that such a debt exists. 2 11 Thus, section 523(a)(7) reflects the
"Congressional policy that bankruptcy should not shield an individual
from the consequences of his wrongful behavior." '212 By exempting from
discharge fines and penalties owed to the government, Congress has
208. Normally, creditors involved in a bankruptcy suit are barred from returning to
state court to resolve disputes concerning a debtor's obligation to pay a debt that arose
prior to bankruptcy, because the filing of a petition in bankruptcy "automatically stays"
collection efforts directed at prepetition debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). However,
the proposed change to § 523(a)(5) of the Code would allow the debtor, and not the credi-
tor, to return to state court for modification or elimination of an alimony, maintenance, or
support obligation. There is no prohibition under the Code against the debtor returning to
state court to modify or eliminate a prepetition debt. See, e.g., In re White Motor Credit
Corp., 37 B.R. 631, (N.D. Ohio 1984) (explaining that automatic stay provisions were in-
tended as a stay of proceedings against the debtor and no other), affd, 761 F.2d 270 (6th
Cir. 1985).
209. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)-(8) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see also infra notes 210-16
and accompanying text.
210. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). Although the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 "made no specific
provision concerning the dischargeability of fines and penalties due to a governmental unit,
but it became well settled that such obligations were not provable and therefore ... not
dischargeable." In re Tauscher, 7 B.R. 918, 919 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981) (citing 3 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY § 523.17 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1979)).
211. See, e.g., Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 51 (1986) (reaffirming that the Code
clearly and unequivocally provides that fines and penalties owed to a governmental unit,
which are not assessed for compensation, are not affected by bankruptcy discharge). Con-
gress has provided, however, that section 523(a)(7)-type debts are dischargeable in a Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see also Pennsylvania
Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990) (holding that a penalty in form of
restitution is a dischargeable debt in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding).
212. In re Ryan, 15 B.R. 514, 520 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981).
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reached a compromise between its desire to provide a bankrupt individ-
ual with a fresh economic start, and government's need to control repre-
hensible conduct.
Similarly, section 523(a)(8)2 13 forecloses dischargeability of debts re-
sulting from educational loans made, insured, or guaranteed by a govern-
mental unit unless they: 1) first became due more than seven years before
the filing of the bankruptcy petition; or 2) the debt would impose an un-
due hardship on the debtor.214 Again, unlike section 523(a)(5), the dis-
chargeability test under section 523(a)(8)'concerning the seven-year
waiting period is self-executing21 5 and does not require the bankruptcy
court to assess the parties' original intentions at the time they entered
into their debtor/creditor relationship.
Likewise, the test for determining whether an educational loan is dis-
chargeable pursuant to the undue hardship standard also avoids an in-
quiry into what the parties "intended" when they incurred the debt in
question. The appropriate inquiry is merely, "whether a debtor's income
is adequate to maintain a minimal standard of living and to pay the edu-
cational loan., 216 This inquiry clearly does not rise to the level of the
bankruptcy court's probing of the minds of the debtor and his or her ex-
spouse. In contrast to section 523(a)(5), Congress has removed virtually
all of the bankruptcy court's discretion in discerning the dischargeability
of debts under sections 523(a)(7)-(8) of the Code. Whereas section
523(a)(5) seems to mandate inquiry into what the parties involved in the
adversary dispute were thinking and feeling at the time the debt in ques-
tion arose, sections 523(a)(7)-(8) avoid such an inquiry altogether.
213. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
214. Id. This section, adopted in 1978, was the congressional response to perceived
abuses resulting from graduating students with well paying jobs discharging large amounts
of student debts before they acquired any significant assets. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6094.
215. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5865. The lender is not required to file a complaint to determine nondischargeability
of any student loan. Id.
216. In re Lekowicz, 119 B.R. 237, 237 (D. Colo. 1990); cf. In re Webb, 132 B.R. 199,
202 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (requiring a poverty-level standard of living and the debtor's
attempts to minimize living expenses before discharging a student loan); see also In re
Gustafson, 111 B.R. 282 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990) (stating that a student loan is presumptively
nondischargeable until a complaint is filed to determine its dischargeability), rev'd on other
grounds, 934 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1991). But see In re Berthiaume, 138 B.R. 516 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1992) (explaining that a relevant inquiry when assessing dischargeability of stu-
dent loans includes any evidence of an "intent" to abuse the bankruptcy system).
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X. ABSTENTION
It is important to note that, even though Congress allows the bank-
ruptcy courts to determine whether an agreement between ex-spouses is
in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, historically, federal
courts have been reluctant to enter the field of family law.217 In fact, as
recently as 1992, in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,218 the United States
Supreme Court reaffirmed the "domestic relations exception" under
which the federal courts decline jurisdiction in certain cases.219 The
Ankenbrandt case, involving child abuse,22 ° established that the federal
diversity jurisdiction statute221 contains an "exception" that divests fed-
eral courts of their jurisdiction to adjudicate certain cases regarding di-
vorce, alimony, or child custody.222 However, the issues in Ankenbrandt
did not fall directly within the "exception.""22 Discussing the historical
reluctance of federal courts to hear family law cases, the Court reasoned
that, even though Article III of the United States Constitution "does not
mandate the exclusion of domestic relations cases from federal-court ju-
risdiction, [this] does not mean that the [federal] courts necessarily must
retain and exercise jurisdiction over [domestic relations] cases.224 In-
deed, the long-standing practice of the Supreme Court and other federal
courts as well is to refrain from hearing such matters.
225
217. See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890); In re Baker, 75 B.R. 120, 121
(Bankr. D. Del. 1987); In re Heslar, 16 B.R. 329, 332 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981); cf In re
Wilson, 85 B.R. 722 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that it is appropriate for bankruptcy
courts to avoid incursions into family law matters; however in this jurisdiction, equitable
distribution of the marital estate does not implicate abstention concerns).
218. 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992).
219. Id. at 2210-15.
220. Ankenbrandt, a resident of Mississippi, alleged that her children were subjected to
child abuse at the hands of their father and his female companion, who were residents of
Louisiana. Id. at 2208-09.
221. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
222. Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2213.
223. Id. at 2215. The factual situation in Ankenbrandt, however, gave rise to a tort,
which does not fall within the domestic relations exception. Id.
224. Id. at 2212 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 2209-10. The Ankenbrandt Court held that it did have jurisdiction to hear
the Ankenbrandts' claim, based upon an historical review of the domestic relations excep-
tion to federal court jurisdiction, concluding that the exception encompasses only matters
of divorce, alimony, or child custody decrees and further finding that the case sub judice
was outside of the list. Id. at 2216. Justice Blackmun, however, in a separate concurrence
provided an even more persuasive reason for hearing the Ankenbrandts' case inasmuch as
he rejected the majority's interpretation of the domestic relations exception as being an
exception to federal diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 2217 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Instead,
Justice Blackmun referred to the domestic relations exception as evolving out of the ever-
developing doctrine of abstention. Id. at 2217-22.
Divorce and the Dischargeability of Debts
While it is conceded that not all family law matters result in the federal
court's abstention, Congress has legislated that "[n]othing ... prevents a
[bankruptcy] court in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity
with State courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing a
particular proceeding arising under title 11 [of the U.S. Code]." '22 6 In
fact, abstention is one of the key devices used by bankruptcy courts to
manage overcrowded dockets.227 For example, a bankruptcy court may
elect to abstain from deciding a case when the issue could be effectively
addressed by a court of concurrent jurisdiction.2"
In light of the traditional policy of the federal judiciary to enter the
family law arena with reluctance, Congress, through grants of legislative
authority, should not enable bankruptcy courts to become "pseudo-fam-
ily law courts." Insofar as Congress has legislated authority to the federal
judiciary to resolve matters involving alimony, maintenance, and support,
state appellate courts are not necessarily the courts of last resort for di-
vorced spouses. In the course of adjudicating bankruptcy cases, bank-
ruptcy courts are forced to address divorce-related concerns, a role the
federal courts are reluctant to undertake themselves, and one that they
are not fully-equipped to perform.
XI. CONCLUSION
This Article is about change. It not only addresses the continuing
struggle to change perceptions that feminist scholarship must be limited
to "female issues," but also serves as a catalyst to change established no-
tions of how bankruptcy law treats women. The change that is mandated
is the deconstruction of institutional biases and the wholesale reshaping
of thinking and behavior so that law, in this case bankruptcy law, is reflec-
tive of and responsive to all members of the population.
"The reasons for federal abstention in these cases are apparent: the strong state
interest in domestic relations matters, the competence of state courts in settling
family disputes, the possibility of incompatible federal and state court decrees in
cases of continuing judicial supervision by the state, and the problem of congested
dockets in federal courts."
Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573, 1578 (11th Cir.) (quoting Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486,
487 (5th Cir. 1978)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 496 (1992).
226. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1988).
227. Henry J. Sommer, The Impact of Bankruptcy on Family Law Cases, in DIvoRcE &
BANKRUPTCY 40-61 (Pennsylvania Bar Inst. ed., 1991).
228. See, e.g., In re Mitchell, 132 B.R. 585 (S.D. Ind. 1991). The district court accepted
the bankruptcy court's recommendation of abstention, noting that the state court had con-
current jurisdiction over this matter, there were ongoing proceedings in state court related
to the divorce obligations, and that the state court was in a better position to discern the
nature of those divorce obligations. Id. at 588.
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In the context of bankruptcy law, women have been historically re-
garded as extensions of their husbands and, upon divorce, they have not
been regarded at all. Such treatment will no longer suffice. Society must
acknowledge women as equal to men and must incorporate into legal
problem-solving analyses the perspectives of women and the effect the
law has on women. Additionally, women must educate themselves and
must seize responsibility for their own financial destinies when ending
marriages. They must not leave the key decisions concerning alimony,
maintenance, and support to ex-husbands, attorneys, or even judges.
Likewise, the bankruptcy bench and bar must transcend the simple ap-
plication of an arbitrary list of factors to determine when a marital debt is
dischargeable. If, however, the legal system is unable to change its think-
ing and attitude toward women and bankruptcy law, the bankruptcy
courts should abstain from considering marital debt discharge questions,
leaving this role to the state divorce courts. Otherwise, Congress should
intervene and divide the bankruptcy and divorce responsibilities between
bankruptcy courts (which would decide only if a debt is the result of a
judgment in a dissolution or a support action) and the state courts (which
would decide if the underlying judgment should be modified or set aside
based upon the spouse's financial condition due to bankruptcy).
This Article does not suggest that a divorce court is the perfect place
for the resolution of marital debt questions when one spouse files for
bankruptcy. If a divorce court is able to review a couple's finances, how-
ever, assess the relative culpability in causing the break-up of the mar-
riage, and determine the amount of money and property that will
counterbalance fairly the effects of the divorce, then that decision should
not be disturbed by the arbitrary and varied factors that bankruptcy
courts develop to determine if such debts are dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy. All too often those factors fail to take into consideration the
needs of and the differences between ex-husbands and ex-wives.
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